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ABSTRACT
During the last two decades, executive aggrandizement has emerged as one of the chief
threats to democratic regimes. In various countries, ranging from Turkey and Hungary to Venezuela, elected incumbents used their democratic mandates to gradually
dismantle democratic institutions. Similar patterns of executive aggrandizement have
been visible even in an advanced democracy, the United States of America. Executive aggrandizement is facilitated by the consistent electoral support that incumbents
with authoritarian agendas enjoy. In order to understand this threat to the future
of liberal democracies, we first need to explain why voters support leaders eroding
democratic rights and freedoms in their countries.
This dissertation aims to bring a psychological perspective to the study of mass
support for executive aggrandizement. To establish a broad theoretical framework,
I offer the concept “affective political ties” as an umbrella term, including partisan
identities, partisan emotions, and affective polarization. Building on this framework
developed in the Introduction, I explore the conditions under which the strength of
affective political ties leads to democratic backsliding. My dissertation reveals how
interactions between various forms of affective political ties and political institutions
condition the relationship between the strength of affective ties and democratic erosion.
This dissertation is formed of four empirical chapters, in addition to introduction and conclusion chapters. First two empirical chapters rely on online survey
experiments conducted in Turkey and Bolivia. My studies in Turkey demonstrate
that provoking partisan enthusiasm and anger increases support for executive aggrandizement among incumbent party voters. Importantly, however, this effect is not
universal. I fail to provoke partisan emotions among incumbent supporters in Bolivia
despite using the same experimental design. I argue that this difference is rooted in
diverging levels of partisan identification across these two countries.
Last two chapters broaden the theoretical and geographical scope of this framework. In the third empirical chapter, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis,
using the CSES data. This study finds that affective polarization is detrimental to
democratic institutions especially when voters polarize over their feelings towards the
ruling party. In the final empirical chapter, I demonstrate how incumbent parties can
use political narratives to build affective ties with their voters, relying on the study
of utopian developmentalist narrative in Turkey.
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Uğur Altundal was a true friend, my kanka. He was the first person I called whenever
I needed help. I shared some of my most emotionally intense moments in Syracuse,
ranging from depressive to beatific ones, with Çağla Çimendereli, Matthew Winning,
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Several decades ago, most scholars and policy-makers were confident that the entire world was moving towards a liberal democratic future. Looking at Figure 1.1,
which shows the trend of democratization between 1980 and 2005, it is not hard to
sympathize with that mood. Starting from the second half of 1970s, liberal democracy
spread all around the world for more than two decades. Yet, the march of democracy
halted several years after the beginning of the 21st century, and a new wave of autocratization has arisen especially since 2010 (Freedom House, 2019).

.25

Average Democracy Score
.3
.35
.4

.45

Figure 1.1: Average democracy score across the world since the end of the Cold War

1980

1990

2000
Year

2010

Data are drawn from the Electoral Democracy Index included in VDem 10 Dataset.

1

2020

1.1 Third wave of autocratization and the role of electoral support
From a broader historical perspective, the current democratic recession was not
totally unexpected. As Huntington (1993) put it, the global diffusion of democracy
occurs through waves, and each wave of democratization eventually meets with a
certain degree of authoritarian backlash. Both in the interwar period and during
1960s various countries fell into authoritarian regimes, albeit briefly. The third wave
of autocratization, as Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) name the current period of
democratic backsliding, is milder in its degree compared to previous waves of autocratization, and it is possible to interpret it as a “correction” following large-scale
democratic gains of the third wave of democratization even in countries lacking relevant structural preconditions (Levitsky and Way, 2015).
Yet, there is something unique to the third wave of autocratization, and we need to
take that into account to have a full picture of the evolution of political regimes in the
world. During the 20th century, most democratic breakdowns occurred through coups
organized by non-democratic actors (Svolik, 2015). Incumbents, on their part, staged
auto-golpes to gain unchecked political power, dissolving the parliament at one stroke.
These forms of democratic breakdowns have become increasingly rare since the end
of the Cold War. Instead, democracies now die slowly, in the hands of incumbents
elected through free and fair elections. It is increasingly common to see elected
incumbents gradually dismantling democratic institutions and turning democracies
into competitive authoritarian regimes, relying on their consistent electoral support.
This form of democratic erosion, which is called executive aggrandizement (Bermeo,
2016), threatens even countries with relatively longer democratic histories, such as
Venezuela, India, and even the United States.
A paradigmatic case of gradual incumbent takeover is Turkey under Recep Tayyip

2

Erdogan’s rule (Bermeo, 2016; Laebens and Öztürk, 2020). Erdogan founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001. In 2002, his party won general elections,
and he became the prime minister of Turkey. Back then Turkey was an electoral
democracy, although the military played a tutelary role and political and civil rights
of Kurdish actors were continually repressed. Under Erdogan’s rule, Turkey went
through a gradual period of democratic breakdown. Erdogan established personalistic
control over the party organization, media, courts, and nearly all other state institutions. As Erdogan’s control over these institutions increased, the room for democratic
opposition narrowed to the extent that it became impossible to call Turkey a democracy (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). By 2019, Erdogan was emboldened enough to force
judicial institutions to repeat the municipal election in Istanbul, the biggest city of
Turkey, when his party lost the election with a slim margin.
The gradual breakdown of Turkish democracy was facilitated by the consistent
electoral support that the AKP enjoyed. Between 2002 and 2017, Erdogan’s party
party won five general elections and three local elections. The party never obtained
less than 40 % of votes in a general election, and Erdogan won presidential elections
twice, both times obtaining more than 50 % of votes in the first round. In the same
vein, AKP voters approved two constitutional referendums, which radically changed
Turkey’s institutional makeup, in 2012 and 2017. Each election and referendum
victory meant approval of Erdogan’s authoritarian tactics, further emboldening him
to attack democratic institutions.
Incumbent takeover that is facilitated by the consistent support of the electorate
is not unique to Turkey. During the last decade several Latin American countries
–most prominently Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, experienced a similar process
(Balderacchi, 2018). Victor Orban created an authoritarian regime at the center of
Europe relying on a similar playbook (Kaufman and Haggard, 2019). Most scholars
3

are afraid that Poland is following the same path. These patterns are traceable even
in the United States, under Trump’s rule.
There is not yet an established literature on causes of incumbent takeover attempts
and determinants of their success. Existing research reveals limitations of structural
factors, such as levels of economic development, in protecting against incumbents with
authoritarian agendas (Tomini and Wagemann, 2018; Sarfati, 2017). Some scholars
suggest that “power imbalances between opposition and incumbent” is the correct
framework for exploring cases of backsliding and breakdown (Tomini and Wagemann,
2018; Waldner and Lust, 2018). Yet, to the extent that our understanding of power
resources is limited to material resources, our explanations will not be enough to
understand the unfolding of democratic erosion.
This dissertation takes two steps to contribute to the existing literature on this
issue. First, it focuses primarily on mass behavior and attitudes. As explained above,
mass support plays an especially crucial role in facilitating the third wave of autocratization. Absent mass support, there can be no incumbent takeover (Balderacchi,
2018). Despite this, there has been no systematic treatment of electoral support for
executive aggrandizement yet. There are various works on mass support for consolidated authoritarian regimes (Magaloni, 2006), but findings from this literature may
not apply to cases of autocratization through executive aggrandizement.
Second, this dissertation brings a psychological perspective to the study of autocratization. More specifically, I explore how voters’ affective reactions to political
actors, broadly defined as “affective political ties,” influence the process of autocratization. This step represents a sharp divergence from the existing literature on
democratic erosion, which predominantly focus on materialistic explanations. My
dissertation reveals how affective political ties harm the health of democratic institutions while also exploring the conditions under which we are most likely to see these
4

effects.
1.2 Conceptualizing affective political ties
In order to study affective politics in comparative context, we first need to establish
a broad conceptual framework, which will allow a certain degree of abstraction for
comparative purposes. I offer “affective political ties” as the entry point for this
analysis.
“Affective political ties” refers to all kinds of psychological bonds, between voters
and political actors, that have either positive or negative valence. This umbrella
term covers, most prominently, positive and negative partisan identities, positive
and negative partisan emotions, affective polarization, and charismatic ties. There
are important differences between these forms of affective political ties, and I will
discuss these differences below in detail. In overall, however, they all include an
affective component, and they are closely related to each other. For example, affective
polarization arises from partisan identities (Iyengar et al., 2019) and partisan emotions
are highly correlated with partisan group identities (Huddy et al., 2018). Thus, it is
theoretically useful to group these ties together and contrast them to non-affective
forms of political ties.
As a whole, affective political ties can be contrasted to programmatic and clientelistic linkages between voters and political actors (Kitschelt, 2000). Programmatic
linkages refer to universal and non-selective goods that parties promise and provide.
They arise from policy or ideology based appeals of political actors. Clientelistic linkages, on the other hand, refer to selective and material incentives linking voters to
parties. These linkages ensure that the voter benefits from particular material goods
and services in exchange for her support for the party; in other words, voter supports
the party to access these goods and services.
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There is a large literature in political science that point to clientelistic or programmatic linkages to explain support for authoritarian regimes. Magaloni (2006)
argues that the PRI, which ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000, could sustain its electoral hegemony thanks to vote-buying and distribution of government transfers to
the poorest segments of the population. Esen and Gumuscu (2020) develop a similar argument to explain voter support for Erdogan in Turkey. They contend that
the AKP successfully established a distributional coalition including a large-enough
group of voters and business-people. In return for the channeling of state resources,
these groups of voters support the AKP’s authoritarian agenda. Svolik (2019) argues
that partisan interests, which include voters’ preferences for specific economic and
social policies, can convince voters to abandon democratic principles. Svolik admits
that loyalties to the party and the leader matter too, yet, categorizing loyalty under
“partisan interests” prevents a serious engagement with the affective dimension.
In contrast to these approaches, this dissertation focuses on the role of affective
linkages. “Affective political ties”, as I name these linkages, refers to the feeling-based
experience that a political actor evokes in an individual. An affective engagement
with a political actor relies on physiological responses in the individual. For example,
Petersen et al. (2015) demonstrate that exposure to party logos leads to skin conductance reactions and these physiological responses are closely related to observed
behavioral patterns in partisans.
Affective ties operate through principles different from clientelistic or programmatic linkages. When we discuss clientelistic and programmatic linkages, we mostly
refer to a transactional relationship between the party and the individual. This relationship is characterized by a rationalist cost-benefit analysis. Affective ties, on
the other hand, cannot be limited to this narrowly rationalistic framework as they
can lead to self-sacrificing behavior (Huddy et al., 2015) or decreased levels of blame
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attribution to certain political actors (Merolla et al., 2007).
Both political organizations and leaders can be the object towards which affective
political ties are directed. This dissertation is mostly about the the former, focusing
on feelings towards political parties. I only briefly refer to personalistic affective ties,
in the form of charisma, in Chapter 5 and in the Conclusion. This is an important
limitation: Personalistic affective ties and partisan affective ties are closely related to
each other, but they can have diverging outcomes on political systems.
My discussion of affective partisan ties in this dissertation revolve around the
three most common forms that these ties take in democracies: partisan identities,
partisan emotions, and affective polarization. Below, I introduce each of them and
explore how they are related to each other.
1.2.1 Partisan identities
Partisanship is defined as the enduring orientation of voters towards particular
parties (Blais et al., 2001). The stability of partisan attachments and their impact
on voter behavior is a well-documented empirical regularity. Yet there are two rival
theories on the origins and the nature of this enduring orientation. On the one hand,
rational theories of partisanship define partisan ties as the running tally of past evaluations of party and leader performance (Fiorina, 1981; Johnston, 2006). According to
this perspective, partisanship is stable only because it requires a significant amount
of new information to cancel evaluations that had accumulated over the past.
A different perspective in partisanship literature points to the psychological bond
between voters and parties (Angus et al., 1960; Green et al., 2004). According to this
perspective, partisanship is rooted in the identification voters establish with political parties. More recently, scholars relied on the Social Identity Theory to explain
party identification, arguing that identifying with the partisan group and believing
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the moral superiority of this group is central to partisan identification (Bankert et al.,
2017; Greene, 1999). In a series of research, Huddy et al. (2015, 2018) have demonstrated that identity-based theories of partisanship better explain mobilization for
the party, compared to rationalist theories.
My understanding of partisanship in this dissertation is rooted in this second
approach. Partisanship is the affective bond between the party and the individual,
arising from the identification of the individual with the political party and supporters
of that political party. When an individual identifies with a political party, the party
becomes a part of the perception of the self. As Bankert et al. (2017) operationalize
this concept, a partisan feels insulted when someone criticizes the party, becomes
happy when the party receives successful results in polls, and uses “us” when referring
to other partisans. In countries with older party systems, scholars trace partisan
identification to early socialization period of individuals, when they are under the
influence of their family and close environment. In Chapter 5, I discuss how the
strength of partisan identification can also be traced to the political narratives spread
by ruling parties.
1.2.2 Partisan emotions
Emotions can be defined as physiological and mental responses to identifiable
stimuli deemed consequential for individual or group objectives (Miller, 2011, 577).
Affective response to a new situation takes the form of a specific emotion based on
the cognitive appraisal of several features of the situation, including threat level,
goal congruence, and personal agency. When we sense a threat, for example, we
feel anger if we are certain about the source of the threat, and we feel fear if we are
uncertain about its source or our ability to cope with it. In return, emotions influence
individuals’ behavioral reactions to the stimuli. Political psychologists have revealed
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that emotions have a significant effect on the processing of new information and
participation in politics (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brader and Marcus, 2013;
MacKuen et al., 2010). Aware of the role that emotions play in politics, political
campaigns frequently try to influence voters’ emotions (Brader, 2005).
This dissertation explores the role of partisan emotions, which is directed at certain political actors. Partisan emotions rely on the cognitive appraisal of the political
environment with respect to certain dimensions, including congruity with political
goals, appraisals about the blame/responsibility of political actors, appraisals about
the partisan control over the situation, and the degree of certainty about these appraisals. In this dissertation, I especially focus on partisan anger and enthusiasm.
Partisan anger potentially occurs when an individual senses a threat to partisan
goals, is certain about the source of that threat, believes that the threat is unfair,
and believes that she can deal with that threat. In response, partisan anger leads to
a confrontational political behavior, such as partisan mobilization. Partisan enthusiasm potentially occurs when an individual is certain that partisan goals are being
reached.
1.2.3 Affective polarization
Finally, affective polarization is the increasing distance among voters with respect
to their feelings towards political parties (Iyengar et al., 2012; Iyengar and Westwood,
2015; Lelkes, 2016).
Traditionally political scientists understood polarization primarily as an ideological phenomenon. “Party system polarization,” which has been the most predominant
concept of polarization in comparative politics, refers to the ideological distance between political parties in a national party system (Sartori, 2005). There have also
been studies on “mass ideological polarization”, which is usually measured through
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the self-placement of respondents over the left-right spectrum (Dalton, 2006; Ezrow
et al., 2014; Jou, 2016).
Political scientists have always recognized the affective dimension; yet, they have
usually feel that it was not necessary to separate the affective dimension from the
ideological one. For example, in an early work, Sartori (1969) listed strong emotions
as an element of ideology. In a recent work, Handlin (2018) aggregates distance and
intensity to produce an aggregate measure of polarization.
In the last few years, however, it has been increasingly noted that political polarization can occur without increasing distance over policy ideas or political ideologies.
Recent research in American politics literature, for example, has indicated that current polarization in United States is essentially about the increasing dislike of other
party. In a different context, Somma (2016) has documented various periods of political polarization in 19th century Latin America when affective polarization was not
accompanied by ideological polarization. Scholars have also documented widespread
effects of affective polarization on both political and non-political phenomenon (Iyengar et al., 2019). These findings require us to seriously evaluate the role of affective
polarization during periods of democratic decline.
1.2.4 Relations between forms of affective partisan ties
Affective component is a central characteristics that partisan identities, partisan
emotions, and affective polarization share. Yet, these three forms of affective political ties diverge on various other dimensions. Most importantly, they are built on
different temporal backgrounds. Compared to partisan emotions and affective polarization, partisan identity is a long-term phenomenon, and it is meant to be largely
stable throughout the life (Converse, 1969). They are formed mostly during the early
socialization period, under the influence of family and the close environment. At
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certain points in life, partisans can feel close to political leaders from other parties
and they can even vote for them. Yet, partisan bonds should still assert its impact
on voter behavior as a separate factor.
Partisan emotions, on the other hand, are short-term and less stable affective
states, which arise in reaction to the most recent political developments. In line with
the definition of emotions, we would expect partisan emotions to be liable to shifts
in their intensity, in response to political events surrounding us.
Affective polarization is situated in between partisan emotions and partisan group
identities in terms of its durability. When we measure affective polarization, we really
compare the variation in the valence, i.e. like-dislike dimension, towards political
parties. Valence is a component of both partisan emotions and partisan identities, it
can also change in response to performance evaluations of parties and leaders. In other
words, affective polarization is probably an aggregate measure combining long-term
affective ties to parties with short-term performance evaluations.
As a parsimonious sociological model, we can argue that partisan identities function as the base upon which affective polarization and partisan emotions develop.
Partisan identities, rooted in historical cleavages and early socialization experiences
of individuals, facilitate the evoking of short-term affective reactions. For example,
to the extent that voters identify with a political party, they will give emotional reactions to the events influencing that party’s political chances. Thus, strong partisans
are more likely to develop partisan emotions in response to threats to the party status
(Crigler and Hevron, 2017; Huddy et al., 2018; McDermott, 2018). I believe that this
model has significant explanatory power, especially for cross-national comparisons.
In Chapter 3, I use this model to explain the difficulty of evoking partisan emotions
in Bolivian voters compared with Turkish voters.
Yet, a sociological model will not do justice to the complex interactions between af11

fective ties and the agency of political actors to build the affective landscape. Depending on the existing political environment, partisan identification, partisan emotions,
and affective polarization can go together, under the influence of political actors. I argue that dominant political narratives play the most important role here. Individuals
interpret political events through these narratives, which locate her life within a historical framework. Narratives bring together events selected from past with a vision
for future, and they introduce a historical significance to the individual’s mundane
life. As such, they evoke partisan enthusiasm, they strengthen partisan identification,
and they trigger affective polarization. This narrative-based approach to the origins
of affective political ties is developed in Chapter 5, through the study of utopian
developmentalist narrative in Turkey. This political model is especially important to
understand how incumbents can instrumentalize affective politics during periods of
democratic backsliding.
1.3 Research Methodology and Case Selection
The central research question of this dissertation is the relationship between affective political ties and democratic erosion. More specifically, my goal is to document
how affective political ties help incumbents build mass support for their authoritarian
agendas.
In order to engage with this question, I follow a multi-methods research design
that brings together cross-national statistical analysis, comparative case studies, online survey experiments, and qualitative discourse analysis. Each of these methodological tools provides a different capability to this research project. By using them
in combination with each other, this dissertation aims to develop an empirically rigorous perspective on the relationship between affective political ties and democratic
erosion. This perspective is deep, in terms of its analysis of causal mechanisms at the
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individual level, and broad, in terms of its cross-national generalizability.
In the following pages, I detail my research design and how I combine these
methodological tools. In Chapter 2 and 3, I implement a comparative case study,
comparing Turkey to Bolivia. These two countries are selected because they differ
in terms of the strength of affective political ties although they were both scenes of
executive aggrandizement attempts during the last decade. I use online survey experiments in Turkey and Bolivia to analyze individual level causal mechanisms at work
in both of these two cases. To generalize findings from my comparative case study,
I use cross-national statistical analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, I conduct qualitative discourse analysis in Turkey, which provides a deeper understanding
of the origins and the nature of affective political ties. Chapter 5 complements the
framework developed in the previous chapter as it explains how incumbent parties
can produce and sustain affective political ties with their voters.
1.3.1 Comparative Case Study: Turkey and Bolivia
In the first step of my research, I conduct a comparative case study, comparing
two countries that are similar on many respects while having different values on
the independent variable, i.e. the strength of affective political ties. This method,
which is built on Mill’s well-known “method of difference,” can also be called as a
controlled comparison (George and Bennett, 2005, ch.6). Limiting the focus on only
two countries helps me to focus on the causal mechanisms between variables of interest
at this initial step of the dissertation.
The two countries that I select for my comparative case study is Turkey and Bolivia. These two countries share some important similarities. They are two middle
income countries that were ruled by populist leaders during the last decade. Both
Turkey and Bolivia have certain levels of historical experience with democratic gover13

nance, but in neither of these countries a consolidated and stable democratic regime
ever emerged. Most importantly, these two countries fit with the “scope condition”
of this comparison: There was an attempt for executive aggrandizement during the
last decade in both countries. Both Evo Morales, who ruled Bolivia between 2006
and 2019, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has been ruling Turkey since 2002, took
steps to monopolize state power and repress the civil, political, and media freedom
in the country.
Despite fulfilling scope conditions, these two countries differ with respect to the
value of the “independent variable”: the strength of affective political ties between the
aggrandizing party and its voters. Strong partisan identities underlie the relationship
between the ruling party AKP in Turkey and its voters; the share of partisans in
Turkey is significantly higher than even advanced democracies (Laebens and Öztürk,
2020). Bolivia, on the other hand, is lacking in this sense; the share of partisans in
Bolivia is lower than the average level in the world.
In addition to the independent variable, these two cases differ with respect to the
outcome variable as well. Erdogan’s attempts for executive aggrandizement have been
successful by all measures; it is now impossible to call Turkey a democracy. During
2016 and 2018, the AKP government undertook a massive purge in the bureaucracy
and jailed tens of thousands of opponents, including political party leaders. Relying
on popular support, the AKP changed Turkey’s parliamentary system into a superpresidential one in 2017. This opened the path for Erdogan to stay in power as
the president until 2028. Erdogan easily won the presidential election in 2018. Evo
Morales, on the other hand, failed in his attempts to extend his stay in power. He ran
in the 2019 presidential election, despite the constitution and the referendum result.
He lost more than 20% of his support in this election, compared to the previous
presidential election, and could not secure a margin large enough to comfortably
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claim victory. Questions about election integrity, fomented by the thin-blade election
results and irregularities in the conduct of election, led to Morales’ removal from
power.
While controlled comparisons can be used to eliminate various alternative explanations and develop a closer look at the potential causal mechanisms, they will not
be sufficient to make causal inferences. No cross-country small-n comparison is perfect; there is simply too much heterogeneity to control. This limitation applies to
the controlled comparison in this study as well. Turkey is significantly richer than
Bolivia, and it is better connected to the global economy. The AKP, the ruling party
in Turkey, is a right-wing party while MAS, the party that ruled Bolivia, is a left-wing
party. Bolivia and Turkey have emerged from different historical trajectories. Turkey
is heir to the Ottoman Empire, and it traditionally has had a strong state. Bolivia is
a more diverse and decentralized country. Finally, Bolivia has a presidential system,
while Turkey was ruled with a parliamentary system until 2017.
These limitations require scholars to combine controlled comparisons with withincase analyses that can help revealing causal mechanisms (George and Bennett, 2005,
ch.8). There are various tools for within-case analyses; scholars can benefit from process tracing, historical narratives, or quantitative analyses. In this dissertation, I conduct online survey experiments, in both Turkey and Bolivia, to reveal individual-level
causal mechanisms in each case. Experiments are the golden standard for internal
validity and causal inference. As such, individual-level analysis of causal mechanisms
supports the aggregate-level comparison between Turkey and Bolivia.
Survey experiments that I conduct in Turkey and Bolivia follow the same experimental design. By manipulating affective states of the incumbent party voters, I
test how their support to the incumbent party’s authoritarian agenda changes. These
experiments follow the same logic with respect to the timing too. In both coun15

tries, experiments were conducted during election periods, which were also scenes of
aggrandizement attempts. Building on these similarities, I compare the differences
between Bolivian and Turkish incumbent party voters’ support to incumbent parties’
authoritarian agendas.
1.3.2 Cross-national statistical research
The comparison between Turkey and Bolivia provides important insights on the
relationship between affective political ties and democratic erosion. However, can
we generalize from the experience of two countries? Do findings from Chapter 2
and 3 travel to other countries? In order to answer these questions, I conduct a
cross-national statistical analysis in Chapter 4.
Replacing country names with variables and producing general knowledge have
been the main goals in the discipline of political science (King et al., 1994; Teune and
Przeworski, 1970). Cross-national statistical analyses, also called as large-N studies,
has been the primary methodological tool for this pursuit. Studying a multitude of
countries at the same time increases the confidence that findings are generalizable
across time and space.
The limitations of regression analyses using long lists of explanatory variables is
well-known (see, Achen, 2005). It is difficult to make causal claims using observational data only, and adding several explanatory variables or using complex statistical
models will rarely be enough to control for the large differences at the country level.
However, when used in combination with other methods, such as experiments and
qualitative case studies, cross-national statistical analysis can still be useful to increase our confidence in the generalizability of findings.
Motivated with this perspective, I use cross-national statistical analysis to test
findings from my controlled comparison. The data for this analysis come from the
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Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). CSES surveys are conducted several months after national elections, and they share a set of common questions. By
June 2018, the CSES online database included 174 different surveys from 55 countries,
conducted between 1996 and 2018 (Quinlan et al., 2018). CSES sample is formed predominantly of advanced democracies, but it also includes countries such as Thailand,
Peru, Kenya, and Albania. Turkey is also among the countries included in CSES surveys. The diversity of this sample allows us to explore questions related to affective
politics with a broader geographical and temporal scope.
1.3.3 Qualitative Discourse Analysis
The first three empirical chapters of this dissertation explore the relationship
between affective political ties and democratic erosion, primarily relying on the use of
quantitative data. Both in the comparative case study and cross-national statistical
analysis, Turkey emerges as a case of strong affective ties and democratic erosion.
Yet, these analyses say little about the nature and origins of strong affective political
ties in Turkey. In order to engage with this question, I conduct a narrative analysis
in Chapter 5, which explores how the discourse of the ruling party in Turkey can
produce and sustain affective political ties. This chapter complements the framework
developed in this dissertation as it helps us to see how incumbents can manipulate
the affective landscape in a country.
Narrative analysis is a form of qualitative discourse analysis. Qualitative discourse
analysis aims to describe how various ideational elements are linked together and to
theorize what kind of effects these relations produce. The data might be all kinds
of verbal and nonverbal materials that are used to express and disseminate opinion.
Qualitative analysis of data necessarily limits the scope of the analysis and the number
of materials that can be analyzed; however, it allows a nuanced look that can capture
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more complex and less visible patterns, hence contributing especially to the theory
development. By carefully analyzing each piece of information, scholars of qualitative
discourse analysis infer broader meaning structures in the society, shared by groups
of people.
Years of scholarly research have revealed some patterns of meaning structures
that are common and widespread across societies; search for these patterns guides
qualitative discourse analysis. For example, scholars starting with the premises of
Laclau’s discourse analysis might explore how distinct verbal and nonverbal elements
are articulated in such a way that the political space is divided into two fronts over a
constitutive antagonism (Laclau, 2005). Narrative is another such pattern, in which
selected elements from the past, present and future are combined to create a temporal
story of collective agency. Narrative analysis explores shared narratives building
collective ideas and identities of a social group (Hammack and Pilecki, 2012).
In Chapter 5, I first analyze the discourse of the AKP to reveal discursive themes
that the party aimed to disseminate among the Turkish people. To ensure the systematic nature of the analysis, I limit my focus mainly to the AKP’s election campaign
in 2011. Having monopolized the political power in the country with the 2010 referendum, AKP abandoned all pretenses of “conservative democratic ideology” and
established a new, more aggressive, discourse in the 2011 election campaign. Based on
election posters, I document the broader narrative that the election campaign aimed
to convey. In the second part of this chapter, I explore how this narrative theme is
associated with affective reactions among the AKP voters. I use video data analysis,
relying on YouTube videos shared by the AKP voters at a specific historical moment,
to examine affective reactions among the AKP voters.
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1.4 Affective political ties and democratic decline: Findings and the outline
This dissertation reveals how affective politics facilitate incumbents’ attempts to
aggrandize their political power, but it also documents the factors that condition this
relationship.
In Chapter 2, I study how partisan emotions shape incumbent voters’ attitudes
towards autocratization, relying on two different survey experiments conducted in
Turkey. Incumbent voters are the most critical group to prevent attempts of incumbent takeover because, by definition, they are large enough to keep the incumbent in
power during the aggrandizement period. In other words, incumbent voters’ rejection of autocratization can save the democratic regime from authoritarian takeover
attempts.
Survey experiments from Turkey demonstrate that partisan anger and enthusiasm
can convince incumbent party voters to support authoritarian steps of the incumbent.
Voters who have higher levels of partisan anger are more likely to approve most
recent steps of autocratization even though they do not prefer authoritarian regime
in principle. Voters who have higher level of partisan enthusiasm, on the other hand,
do not engage with opposition’s complaints about the impending authoritarianism.
I believe that this finding reveals the logic of gradual incumbent takeover. In each
critical juncture, such as a referendum, incumbents like Erdogan can manipulate
partisan emotions to build mass support for their authoritarian agenda. They do not
need a voter group supportive of authoritarianism in principle, as long as they can
evoke partisan emotions.
Chapter 3 qualifies findings from the second chapter, and it reveals the interaction
between forms of affective political ties. This chapter builds on a survey experiment
conducted in Bolivia, which follows the design of the first survey experiment con-
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ducted in Turkey. Bolivia is selected as another case of attempted incumbent takeover
that is comparable to Turkey. The crucial finding of this experiment is that, although
I use the same survey design, I fail to replicate findings of the survey in Turkey. I
even fail to manipulate partisan anger in Bolivia in a statistically significant way, let
alone demonstrating the impact of partisan anger on political attitudes. I argue that
this failure to provoke partisan anger in Bolivia is grounded in the lack of strong partisan identities in Bolivia. Thus, this chapter makes a contribution to the literature
by showing that manipulation of partisan emotions for political gains requires some
antecedent conditions.
In the fourth chapter, I extend the geographical scope of my research, studying the
role of affective polarization through a cross-national analysis. This chapter also takes
into account how affective polarization interacts with ideological polarization and the
institutional framework. I find that democracies are especially under threat when people polarize over their feelings towards the executive. Affective polarization over the
incumbent fully mediates negative effects of ideological polarization on democratic
regimes, revealing the importance of affective political ties for democratic erosion.
Importantly, I also demonstrate that the distribution of political power moderates
the relationship between ideological and affective polarization; ideological polarization leads to affective polarization over the incumbent especially when constraints to
executive authority are weak.
The fifth chapter complements the framework developed in this dissertation. In
this chapter, I explore how the ruling party in Turkey uses political narratives to establish affective political ties with its voters. Despite the young age of its party system,
Turkey is one of the most affectively polarized countries in the world (Lauka et al.,
2018), and the strength of partisan group identities in Turkey is higher than many developed countries (Laebens and Öztürk, 2020). Most scholars explain widespread af20

fective political ties in Turkey with reference to the secular-Islamist cleavage. Without
rejecting the role of historical structures, Chapter 5 aims to develop a narrative-based
framework to study origins of partisan affects. I demonstrate that the incumbent
party in Turkey has used the utopian developmentalist narrative in a skillful manner
to build affective political ties. Combining this chapter with previous chapters, in
which I demonstrate the impact of partisan emotions and affective polarization on
democratic backsliding, offers a general model to explain mass support for executive
aggrandizement in Turkey and beyond.
This dissertation reveals the significant role that affective political ties play during
periods of executive aggrandizement. More importantly, however, this dissertation
points to conditions under which these effects occur. In line with the ignorance of
affective politics in the political science literature for a long time, we know very little
about the interactions between forms of affective political ties and other institutional
and ideological factors. In the conclusion, I discuss these limitations in the existing
literature, contribution of this dissertation, and avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2

PARTISAN EMOTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR EXECUTIVE
AGGRANDIZEMENT IN TURKEY

Voter support for incumbents with authoritarian agendas is puzzling. Most voters
prefer democratic regimes (Kiewiet de Jonge, 2016), and they strongly dislike powerhungry leaders (Kinder et al., 1980). Furthermore, emerging authoritarian regimes
diminish these very voters’ power to influence political outcomes. Why do voters
continue supporting incumbents with authoritarian agendas, then?
The existing literature on regime preferences focuses on political values and economic interests to explain authoritarian regime preferences. None of these approaches,
however, helps us to understand support for executive aggrandizement. In this chapter, I offer partisan emotions to explain how incumbents can build mass support for
their authoritarian agendas, despite democratic preferences of most voters.
The remaining part of this chapter is formed of four sections. First, I review the
literature on regime preferences and argue that a focus on affective political ties is
necessary. In the following two sections, I respectively explore the impact of partisan
anger and partisan enthusiasm on the behavior of incumbent supporters, using two
online survey experiments conducted in Turkey in Summer and Fall 2019. In the last
section, I discuss broader implications of my findings.
2.1 Explaining Voter Support for Executive Aggrandizement
To begin with, a vast literature in political science, going back to Easton (1957)’s
seminal work, considers “support for democracy” as a stable political value, assuming
that democratic values will guide voters to vote against authoritarian leaders (for a
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review, see Mattes, 2018). Most recently, Claassen (2020) has demonstrated that
voter support for democracy helps democracies survive.
This perspective does not help us to understand the third wave of autocratization,
because there are not significant differences, with regard to democratic values, between countries that have recently gone through executive aggrandizement and others
that have not. In Turkey, for example, the World Values Survey that was conducted
in 2012, when the country was going through a radical process of executive aggrandizement, found support for democracy at 77 %, which was on a par with established
democracies surveyed in the same wave.

1

This is not only about the discursive

appeal of the “D-word.” Even when scholars avoid abstract statements referring to
“democracy,” measuring committed support for the principle of power-sharing and
vertical accountability, they find similar results. For example, through an analysis of
LAPOP surveys conducted between 2006 and 2012, Kiewiet de Jonge (2016) demonstrates that around 80 % of Latin American voters reject executive coups on courts
and congress. In Venezuela, which was going through a radical process of executive aggrandizement during those years, 83.2 % of voters rejected executive coups on
legislative branches.
A second strand of research posits that authoritarian systems enjoy genuine popular support as long as they can deliver material benefits to the citizens (Magaloni,
2006; Rose et al., 2011). There is a certain truth in this argument. It is no coincidence
that most successful aggrandizers of the last decade, i.e., Putin, Erdogan and Chavez,
all built their popular support during the era of fast economic growth in early 2000s
and their popularity declined during the economic recession of 2010s (Greene and
1

Support for democracy was measured as the proportion of voters who answered the question
“How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?” with a score of
8/10 or higher. This proportion was % 88 in Sweden % 84 in Germany, % 77 in Turkey, % 75 in
Spain, % 73 in Chile, % 73 in South Korea, and % 72 in the United States.
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Robertson, 2019; Judah, 2013; Kalaycioğlu, 2008; Nadeau et al., 2013). Still, popular
support for these regimes survived economic crises, and significant aggrandizement
occurred after the end of economic boom period. In the case of Turkey, for example,
Erdogan supporters approved a constitutional referendum that changed Turkey’s parliamentarian system into a hyper-presidental one in 2017, amid an ongoing economic
crisis.
Most recently, scholars have pointed to the role of “partisanship” to explain voter
support for autocratization. Analyzing voter behavior during the above-mentioned
2017 constitutional referendum in Turkey, Aytaç et al. (2017) find that partisanship
largely explains the voting behavior of incumbent voters. Similarly, through an experimental study in Hungary, Ahlquist et al. (2018) demonstrate that voters follow
partisan cues to decide their vote on constitutional referendum changing the electoral
law (also see, Graham and Svolik, 2020). These works are promising, but there is still
a lot to explain. How and why do partisan ties explain voting for authoritarianism?
Is this simply cue taking in an overly technical topic, as rationalist theories of partisanship suggest (Shively, 1979)? Or, does partisanship account for certain visceral
processes affecting our reasoning?
A focus on the role of partisan emotions offers a promising avenue to understand
why voters support aggrandizement. I argue that certain partisan emotions play
a significant role during periods of aggrandizement by convincing incumbent voters
to support authoritarian acts of the incumbent. Most incumbent voters, even in
countries like Turkey and Venezuela, are supportive of democratic principles. They
enjoy the power to choose who rules the country, and they are skeptical of powerhungry leaders. Granted, they do not take opposition protests about impending
authoritarianism seriously in the beginning. Yet, as the authoritarian steps of the
ruling party become increasingly blatant, some of these voters hesitate to continue
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their support for the ruling party. I argue that, partisan emotions play a significant
role during these moments of confusion for incumbent voters. Anger at the opposition
party and enthusiasm for the incumbent party convince incumbent voters to support
aggrandizement, even if they are still against authoritarianism in principle.
2.2 Incumbent voters support executive aggrandizement when they are angry at
the opposition party
2.2.1 The role of partisan anger: Theory and hypotheses
According to appraisal theories in political psychology, anger primarily arises from
the appraisal of harm inflicted upon the self by an intentional actor (Batson et al.,
2009; Hechler and Kessler, 2018). Blame attribution is central to the feeling of anger;
research demonstrates that, for example, people are more likely to make causal judgements about terrorist attacks when they are primed to feel anger, rather than sadness (Small et al., 2006). As a result, angry individuals are more likely to take
risks and confront the actor inflicting harm upon the self, with the goal of punishing
or correcting the “unfair action.” Research demonstrates that angry individuals are
more supportive of punitive policies (Hartnagel and Templeton, 2012; Johnson, 2009;
Garcı́a-Ponce et al., 2018), military campaigns (Cheung-Blunden and Blunden, 2008;
Huddy and Feldman, 2011), and aggression during civil conflicts (Spanovic et al.,
2010). Angry individuals are also more likely to rely on existing dispositions during
their reasoning. In politics, this means that angry individuals will stick more closely
to their partisan and ideological commitments (MacKuen et al., 2010; Suhay and
Erisen, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).
In this study, I focus on partisan anger, i.e. anger felt at a political party. Partisan
anger may derive from positive partisan identities: Partisans are more likely to feel
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anger when they think that the rival party threatens their party’s electoral status
(Huddy et al., 2018) or when their co-partisans are exposed to uncivil attacks from the
rival party (Gervais, 2019). Yet, analyses of American election surveys demonstrate
that it is also quite common to see anger at one party as decoupled from a strong
attachment to another party (Groenendyk, 2018), a phenomenon that can be called
negative partisanship (Medeiros and Noël, 2014).
I argue that anger at the opposition party leads to support for aggrandizement in
two different ways: convincing incumbent voters that the opposition party violates
societal norms and generating demand among incumbent voters for retribution.
To begin with the former, incumbent supporters become more likely to rely on
the incumbent propaganda when they feel angry at the opposition party. Angry individuals are more likely to associate the out-group with negative character attributes
(DeSteno et al., 2004), and they are more likely to be influenced by their existing
identities (MacKuen et al., 2010). These effects matter during periods of executive
aggrandizement, when opposition parties protest against the incumbent attack on
democracy and the incumbent tries to justify its authoritarian moves. Anger at the
opposition party convinces incumbent voters to believe the incumbent propaganda
and ignore the protests of the opposition.
Second, as incumbent voters believe that the opposition party violates norms and
harms their interests, they become more intolerant of opposition activities and more
supportive of retributive measures. Anger is associated with the belief that the other
party has violated a norm and its supporters deserve a punishment for this. Applying
this to the context of autocratization, we can expect that angry incumbent supporters
will be more supportive of government behavior that will “punish” opposition actors.
I do not expect anger at the opposition party to have a significant effect on regime
preferences and support for authoritarian rule -including authoritarian rule by one’s
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own party. Political values are usually formed around abstract and general ideals.
Judgements ensuing from partisan anger, on the other hand, are rather particular
and contextual. Incumbent voters do not significantly change their regime preferences
when they are angry; they only approve the punishment of a wrongdoing.
2.2.2 Data
In order to measure the impact of partisan anger on the behavior of incumbent
voters, I conducted an online survey experiment in Turkey in June 2019.
Under Turkey’s current hyper-presidential system, the only remaining path of opposition parties to meaningful political power is the mayorship of major cities. Local
politics has especially gained significance when the main opposition party, Republican People’s Party (CHP), won mayorships of both Istanbul and Ankara in the 2019
Turkish local election, which was held on March 31. The election result was a shock to
the ruling party, which had governed those cities for the last two decades. Especially
dramatic one for the AKP was the defeat in Istanbul; the government candidate lost
the election with a margin of 0.03 %. Rather than accepting the defeat, the AKP
chose to force the Supreme Electoral Council to cancel the Istanbul election. The
Supreme Electoral Council acquiesced to the AKP’s pressure, and it announced repeat elections in Istanbul to be held on June 23. Arguably, this was the AKP’s most
blatant attack ever on democratic institutions in Turkey. By not recognizing the election result, the AKP was pushing the threshold between competitive authoritarianism
and full authoritarianism.
My survey uses this unfortunate experience of the Turkish democracy to study
how partisan anger affects voter behavior. The survey was conducted between June
1 and June 21, right before the repeat election in Istanbul.
2

2

All of the survey

I used the online opt-in panel of Next Generation, a public opinion research company based
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participants were incumbent supporters that were registered to vote in Istanbul. I
define incumbent supporters as participants who had either voted for the incumbent
party in the previous election or defined themselves as AKP partisans. Those who
did not provide any of these conditions were filtered out.
To measure support for autocratization, I first asked respondents their attitudes
towards the election cancellation:
• Do you think that the decision to cancel the March 31 election was correct and
fair?
After this question, I asked respondents to rate the following six statements on a
scale extending from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”:
• CHP supporters should not be allowed to organize election campaign in my
neighborhood.
• If the CHP wins the Istanbul election again, the election should be completely
cancelled.
• Media organizations that constantly broadcast pro-CHP news should be shut
down.
• If the CHP wins the next presidential election, they should not be allowed to
govern the country.
• If he deems it necessary, the president should be allowed to cancel elections and
rule the country without elections.
• When there is a national crisis, the president should be allowed to disband the
Parliament and rule without the Parliament.
As can be seen, these statements were ordered in terms of their level of generin Turkey. Compared to the general public, survey participants were more educated, had higher
household income, were more partisan.
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alization. The first two statements includes limited measures against the CHP, and
they were only relevant for the context of repeat elections in Istanbul. The third and
fourth statements included more radical and broader measures against the CHP. They
were no more limited to Istanbul elections. Finally, the last two statements were the
most abstract ones. They also captured decidedly authoritarian preferences. The last
one was the statement used to measure authoritarian preferences in LAPOP surveys.
Importantly, the order of these statements was randomized for survey participants.
The independent variable was anger at the opposition party. In order to manipulate anger I used self-writing tasks, a method becoming increasingly common
among political psychologists (Erisen, 2018). Two hundred participants were randomly assigned to two groups: anger and control. In order to induce anger, I asked
respondents in the treatment group to write what makes them angry at the CHP
or CHP supporters. Participants in the control group were instructed to write what
they do to relax; the goal here was to create an emotion-free atmosphere for these
participants. After the treatment, all participants answered same questions. At the
end of the survey, I asked respondents how they felt towards the CHP and the AKP
to check whether the treatment was successful.
To begin with, the anger treatment was effective to stimulate anger at the opposition party, as can be seen from Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Manipulation check: Manipulating partisan anger in Turkey
CHP-Anger
Treatment: Anger to CHP
Base: Daily Routine
N

0.694∗
(0.021)
202

CHP-Anger CHP-Fear
(w. controls)
0.874∗∗
0.123
(0.004)
(0.641)
183
202

CHP-Fear
(w. controls)
0.207
(0.460)
183

AKP-Enthusiasm AKP-Enthusiasm
(w. controls)
0.130
0.166
(0.631)
(0.499)
202
183

p-values in parentheses: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls are age, education, income, gender, and partisanship strength. Dependent variable ranges from 1 to 7.

Participants exposed to the anger treatment felt significantly more anger at the
CHP. Importantly, the groups did not differ with regards to other partisan emotions,
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i.e., enthusiasm for the AKP and fear from the CHP.
To get a better grasp of the sample, I analyzed what respondents wrote about
the CHP. This exercise does not provide representative insights on AKP voters, but
it can still be informative for interpreting findings of this survey. To begin with,
twenty respondents told that they did not feel anger at the CHP: They had some
disagreements but these did not amount to the feeling of anger. This is close to a
finding from a representative survey that 30 % of AKP supporters in Istanbul do not
feel anger at the CHP (Erdogan et al., 2019).
The analysis of the remaining eighty respondents reveals three distinct sources
of anger at the CHP. On the one hand, a group of respondents complain about the
CHP’s and CHP supporters’ negative attitudes towards religious voters and religion.
These answers reflect the ideological cleavage in Turkey, between secularism and the
Islamic life style. These answers also fit squarely with the definition of “negative
partisanship” (Medeiros and Noël, 2014), as respondents associate CHP supporters
with a certain attitude, independently from their positive assessments towards another
party. There are several examples of first-person experiences of past discrimination in
the sample. For example, one of the respondents said that “I was insulted by several
people, who told that they were CHP supporters, because I wore headscarf. If what
they said is true and if these people really have connections to the party, then I feel
antipathy because of what they told to me.”

3

In other examples, the respondent

identifies with those exposed to discrimination: “First of all, I know that the CHP is
a real enemy of the religion. We have not forgotten what they did to our headscarfed
sisters and we will never forget...”

4

. It is important to note that the AKP and its

3

In Turkish: Başörtülü olduğum için CHP taraftarı olduğunu söyleyen birkaç kişi tarafından
hakarete maruz kaldım. Eğer söyledikleri doğruysa ve bu kişiler parti ile bağlantılı ise önyargılı
davranışları sebebiyle antipati hissediyorum.
4

In Turkish: Öncelikle CHP partisinin tam bir din düşmanı olduğunu biliyorum türbanlı kardeslerimize ettikleri muameleyi unutmadık unutmıyacagız.
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media plays an important role in sustaining the anti-religious image of the CHP, by
stirring up past injustices.

5

Secondly, there is a group of respondents who complain about the opposition style
of the CHP, describing its leaders as liars who oppose every single positive step that
the AKP took. Most of these responses include positive references to the AKP and
Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well. I believe that the anger of these voters is derivative of
their positive feelings towards the AKP. In other words, they are angry at the CHP
because they are AKP partisans. When CHP leaders criticize the AKP’s policies,
these partisans feel threatened. For example, some of the respondents describe the
origins of her anger in the following way: “Lies and constant slanders of the CHP
leader Kilicdaroglu,” “They do not care about Turkey, their grudge against Erdogan
has blinded them,” ”That they constantly criticize everything; they criticize whenever
the president says something, they have yet to say one positive word for something
that the president [Erdogan] did.”

6

Finally, there is a third group of responses, in which respondents accuse the CHP
to have a relationship with “enemies” and “terrorist groups,” mainly with reference to
the Kurdish political movement of Turkey. This discourse was frequently used by Erdogan during the campaign period to demonize the CHP (Esen and Gumuscu, 2019);
seemingly, it has been successful to a certain extent. For example, respondents say
that “CHP has been working together with anyone whose interests conflict with our
country, even when those are terrorists,” or “Unfortunately, rather than expressing
their own thoughts, CHP is collaborating with other countries and pro-terror parties
5

For example, see the video, created by the AKP before 2018 elections, https://video.haber7.
com/video-galeri/121101-ak-partiden-dunu-ve-bugunu-anlatan-muhtesem-reklam-filmi
6

In Turkish: “Chp partisinin başkanı kılıçlar oğlunun yalanları surekli iftiraları”, “Türkiye
umurlarında degil erdoğana olan kinleri gözlerini kör ermiş”, “Surekli olarak herseye bir kulp takmalari yani c.baskani bisey dese hemen onun konusmasina elestfi yapiliyor hic bu zmna kadar
c.baskaninin soyledigi yaptigi bir ise bu iyidir demediler”.
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that want Turkey’s ruin and it is expressing what they want.”

7

2.2.3 Findings
I use ordered logistic regression to test the effect of anger treatment on support for
the seven statements listed above. The range of the dependent variable extends from
zero for “strongly disagree” to four for “strongly agree.” Figure 2.1 presents results
from the analysis.
Figure 2.1: Effects of anger on support for autocratization in Turkey
Effects of Anger Treatment
Election Repeat is Fair
Allow CHP Campaign
Cancel Elections if CHP Wins Again
Close pro-CHP media
Cancel if CHP Wins Presidency
Executive Coup is OK-1
Executive Coup is OK-2
-.5

0

.5

1

1.5

*Controls: Age, Education, Income, Gender, Partisanship Strength.

To begin with, partisans exposed to the anger treatment were more likely to believe
that it was fair to repeat elections. This finding is striking especially given the timing
of the survey. After March 31, politics in Turkey was largely focused on Istanbul
elections. Endless recounts lasted for more than a month, and parties started their
election campaigns immediately after the announcement of the repeat of elections in
April 2019. In this context, we would expect voters’ opinions to be already formed
by the time the survey was fielded. Even under these circumstances, however, the
7

In Turkish: “CHP geçmişten günümüze ülkemizin çıkarlarına ters olan kim olursa olsun
teröristte olsa onlarla hareket ediyor” , Malesef kendi duygu ve düşünceleri halka anlatmak yerine , Türkiye’nin kötülüğünü isteyen dış ülkeler ve terör yandaşı partiler ile işbirliği içinde olup
onların istediğini anlatmaktadır.
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anger treatment could shift perceptions of fairness of election cancellation.
When we look at the remaining six statements, we see that the anger treatment
has a significant impact on the first two of them, but not others. The first two
statements are directly about Istanbul elections, and, compared to others, they refer
to milder forms of repression. The remaining statements, especially the last two,
are abstract and general, directly capturing preferences for an authoritarian rule.
Thus, it seems that, anger at the opposition party does not lead to a general support
for authoritarianism. This is not relieving news, however. Aggrandizers do not need
committed support for authoritarianism to establish an authoritarian regime. Rather,
what they need is a group of voters that may lend their support at critical moments.
This chapter demonstrates that provoking anger may help the incumbent to realize
this.
2.3 Incumbent voters oppose executive aggrandizement when they lose their
partisan enthusiasm
In this section, I focus on the “other part” of the story: partisan enthusiasm. As
the scholarly community has largely been preoccupied with the increasing partisan
hostility, which reveals itself through partisan anger, negative partisanship, and incivility, we tend to ignore positive emotions, which seem less potent and threatening.
Yet, partisan enthusiasm characterizes many of the aggrandizing regimes as much
as partisan anger does (e.g., see Havlı́k and Voda, 2018; Love and Windsor, 2018;
Montiel and Uyheng, 2020).
In the remaining parts of this section, I first demonstrate that incumbent voters are more likely to oppose autocratization when they feel less enthusiasm for the
incumbent party. The study also reveals that providing more information to participants about aggrandizement, including both critical and supportive arguments,
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convinces participants to oppose aggrandizement when they do not feel enthusiastic
for the ruling party. Highly enthusiastic incumbent voters, on the other hand, become
even more supportive of autocratization when they hear further information on autocratization. Bringing these findings together points to the crucial role that partisan
enthusiasm plays during periods of backsliding.
2.3.1 The role of partisan enthusiasm: theory and hypotheses
Enthusiasm is aroused when there is a stimulus indicating that a goal has been
met or will be met. The feeling of enthusiasm informs us that the current environment is rewarding. As a result, enthusiastic individuals tend to follow their existing
predispositions. When they process a message, they rely more on the source of the
message rather than its content (Lerner et al., 2015; Marcus et al., 2000).
Some sources of political enthusiasm can be listed as the enactment of desired
policies, the lead one’s party has in the polls, the smile of a charismatic politician,
or the use of uplifting music in campaign advertising (Brader and Marcus, 2013;
Huddy et al., 2018). When partisans feel enthusiasm, their party identities play a
more significant role during opinion formation (Brader, 2005), and they participate
more in politics to support their parties (Valentino et al., 2011). These effects are the
same with those of anger, yet the existing literature usually finds that the feeling of
enthusiasm produces weaker effect sizes compared to the feeling of anger (Suhay and
Erisen, 2018; Valentino et al., 2011).
In this study, I argue that incumbent voters become more likely to support executive aggrandizement when they feel enthusiastic about the incumbent party. This
is simply because partisans feel more confidence in their party at those moments,
hence paying less attention to counter-arguments during the process of reasoning.
Even though opposition parties protest against aggrandizement, these protests fall
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on deaf ears, failing to influence the opinion of incumbent voters. When incumbent
supporters feel less enthusiasm, on the other hand, they go through a more critical
process of reasoning, and become more open to opposition arguments.
2.3.2 Data
In order to test effects of partisan enthusiasm on voter support for autocratization,
I conducted another online survey experiment in Turkey in October 2019. The sample
was formed of five hundred AKP supporters, who had either voted for the AKP in
the last election or had defined themselves as AKP partisan.
By the time I fielded the survey, the opposition candidate had won the repeat
election in Istanbul. Yet, there were rumors that the government could remove opposition mayors of Istanbul and Ankara using legal means, a tactic the AKP government
frequently used against Kurdish mayors during the last few years. In line with these
rumors, Erdogan and the Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu repeatedly threatened opposition mayors of Ankara and Istanbul with removal.

8

Hence, the main dependent

variable in this study is whether respondents support the removal of Istanbul and
Ankara mayors or not.
In order to manipulate partisan enthusiasm, I used self-writing tasks. There are
some important differences between this study and Study 1, however. There are three
different treatment groups in this study: enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety. Unlike the
previous study, I did not mention party names in any of the treatment conditions; instead, I asked participants to write down what made them enthusiastic/angry/anxious
about the political and economic situation in Turkey. In addition to these, I formed
two control groups: political and non-political. For the former, I asked participants
to write down what they thought about the current situation of Turkish politics. In
8

https://www.voanews.com/europe/crisis-looms-erdogan-targets-istanbul-mayor
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the second control group, I told participants to write down a regular day of theirs.
This design aims to provide a stronger understanding of the causal mechanisms at
work. Five hundred participants were randomly assigned to each of these groups.
In order to give participants a chance to think thoroughly on the issue, and to
follow how their decision changes as they think more, each respondent was asked
twice about their support for the removal of opposition mayors. First one was right
after the respondents were exposed to the treatment. Second one was after they
read eight different statements on this issue. Four of these statements defended the
removal of mayors, while the other four criticized it. As explained above, we would
expect enthusiastic voters to stick to their partisan identities both the first time and
the second time. On the other hand, partisans that are not enthusiastic should be
more likely to change their minds as they read these statements.
To check whether treatments worked as intended, I asked respondents, at the end
of the survey, to what extent they feel enthusiastic for the AKP, angry at the CHP,
and afraid of the CHP, on a scale from one to seven. Results are visually presented
in Figure 2.2 with error bars.
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Enthusiasm
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Figure 2.2: Manipulation check: Manipulating enthusiasm, anger, and anxiety in
Turkey
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To start with, none of the treatments created a significant change across levels of anger at the CHP, as the graph located on the right-hand side of Figure 2.2
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demonstrates. To remind, using a treatment different from the first study on anger,
I did not ask respondents what made them angry at the CHP. Instead, participants
wrote down what made them angry about the Turkish politics. Apparently, anger at
the political and economic situation of the country does not directly prime negative
emotions towards the main opposition party. Interestingly, provoking anger at the
situation of the country led to the increased feeling of fear of the CHP.
When we compare levels of enthusiasm, located on the left-hand side of Figure 2.2,
we see statistically significant changes across treatment groups. Surprisingly, however, enthusiasm treatment is not the primary source of the variation across levels of
enthusiasm. The level of enthusiasm is the same across enthusiasm and non-politicalcontrol groups, while it is lower in other three groups (political-control, anger, and
anxiety). I believe that this implies a ceiling effect: AKP partisans hold strong
positive feelings towards their party even when they are not primed to think about
political issues. When they think about the current political situation of the country,
however, their level of enthusiasm erodes. The most significant drop occurs among
the voters in the anxiety condition. Participants in the anxiety condition feel significantly less enthusiastic towards the AKP, compared to voters in the political control
condition, non-political control condition, and the enthusiasm condition.
To get a better idea of the collected data, I analyzed the content of responses to
self-writing tasks. In the enthusiasm condition, around twenty of the respondents did
not provide an enthusiastic answer; ten of these respondents explicitly said that there
was nothing to be enthusiastic about Turkey’s current condition. Around sixty of the
remaining eighty respondents, on the other hand, responded with partisan themes:
Erdogan’s leadership, material services provided by the AKP, and AKP supporters’
mobilization against the coup attempt in 2016. Finally, around twenty participants
responded with nationalist themes, such as Turkey becoming a leader country in the
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world or Turkey’s “victories” in the “war against terror” in Syria. Respondents in
anxiety and political-control conditions produced quite different answers. Complaints
about economic problems predominated in both. In the anxiety condition, around
sixty of all respondents complained about economic problems, while twenty respondents were worried about the war in Syria and the refugee crisis. In the political
control group, most respondents were critical about the situation in the country.
2.3.3 Findings
First, let’s compare how support for the removal of opposition mayors varies across
the five groups of respondents. To remind, all respondents answered this question
twice: right after the treatment and after reading four supportive and four critical
statements about the issue. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the mean values that the dependent variable takes across all these conditions. The scale of the dependent variable
extends from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).

2.5

2.6

Support for Aggrandizement
2.7
2.8
2.9

3

Figure 2.3: Changes in the level of support for autocratization in Turkey
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The figure reveals that, among the five groups of respondents, those in the anxiety
condition profess the lowest levels of support for executive aggrandizement, both after
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the first question and after they read supportive and critical statements. The initial
levels of support in control conditions are close to the initial level of support in the
enthusiasm condition. However, levels of support diverge as respondents engage with
arguments on the issue. Participants in the control conditions change their minds and
become more critical of autocratization steps while participants in the enthusiasm
condition become even more supportive. This is in line with the argument that
enthusiastic voters closely follow their existing predispositions during reasoning. The
difference between the enthusiasm condition and two control conditions, regarding
the change between the first answer and the second answer, is statistically significant
with a p value of 0.024.
Are the final differences across five respondent groups statistically significant,
and is it really about the changing levels of enthusiasm? In order to answer these
questions, I first conduct an ordered logit regression. Below, Figure 2.4 compares
levels of statistical significance for five different pairs of respondent groups. These
pairs are listed on the left-hand side of the coefficient plot. To be clear, these are not
variables in the same model; each row refers to the explanatory variable of a different
model.
Figure 2.4: Effects of emotions on support for autocratization in Turkey
Effects of Anxiety and Enthusiasm
Treatment: Anxiety vs. Enthusiasm

Treatment: Anxiety vs. Pol. Control

Treatment: Anxiety vs. Control

Treatment: Enthusiasm vs. Pol. Control

Treatment: Enthusiasm vs. Control
-1.5

-1
-.5
0
.5
Support for Aggrandizement

Note: Demographic control variables added.
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1

To start with, the top row demonstrates the effect of the anxiety treatment when
compared with the effect of enthusiasm treatment. This is the model in which the
difference becomes most clear. The effect is similarly significant when each of two
control conditions are chosen as the base condition to the anxiety treatment. There
is no such effect, on the other hand, when control conditions are used as the base
condition to the enthusiasm treatment. As I have demonstrated above, there is no significant difference across the enthusiasm treatment and control conditions regarding
the level of partisan enthusiasm evoked among the respondents.
The first three models are significant; but are these effects really mediated by
enthusiasm, as argued above? Table 2.2 presents the proportion of effects mediated
by partisan enthusiasm in the first three models. Results demonstrate that enthusiasm
mediates these effects to a significant degree, ranging between 25 % and 39 %. Once
we control for partisan enthusiasm, the relationship between treatments and outcomes
falls below the conventional level of statistical significance in all three models.
To summarize, this study demonstrates that when partisans lose their enthusiasm
for the incumbent party, they become less supportive of the executive aggrrandizement. Below, I discuss this finding from a broader perspective.
2.4 Conclusion
Incumbent voters may support acts of autocratization even when they reject authoritarianism in principle. Serious acts of autocratization, such as election cancellation, force the AKP voters to make a decision: Will they approve the consolidation of
power at the hands of Erdogan? Emotions play a significant role for decision making
during these critical moments.
When voters are angry at the opposition party, they become more likely to support
acts of autocratization. AKP voters in the first study, who were exposed to the anger
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Table 2.2: The mediation of treatment effects by enthusiasm for the AKP
Coefficient

p value

Treatment: Anxiety-Enthusiasm
Total Effect
-0.23
Direct Effect
-0.14
Mediated by Enthusiasm -0.09
Proportion
0.39

0.005**
0.078
0.011*

Total Effect
-0.16
Direct Effect
-0.12
Mediated by Enthusiasm -0.04
Proportion
0.25

0.039*
0.11
0.085

Total Effect
-0.18
Direct Effect
-0.013
Mediated by Enthusiasm -0.06
Proportion
0.33

0.018*
0.108
0.033*

Treatment: Anxiety-Control (Pol.)

Treatment: Anxiety-Control (Non-Pol.)

Note: Controls (age, gender, education, income, partisanship strength) are added.

treatment, recalled how seculars in Turkey had repressed their freedom before the
AKP came to the power and how CHP supporters looked down upon them even
today. After recalling these events, they felt more anger at the CHP. While these
angry voters still rejected the establishment of a fully authoritarian regime in the
country, they were more supportive of steps to force an election repeat in Istanbul.
Thus, this study demonstrates that provoking anger at the opposition party helps
the AKP to overcome its voters’ resistance to autocratization. Enthusiasm for the
ruling party leads to similar results. My findings from the second study demonstrate
that enthusiasm for the ruling party plays an important role in convincing AKP
voters to support autocratization. When incumbent voters lose their enthusiasm,
they engage more with opposition arguments, and they become more likely to oppose
autocratization.
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These findings significantly improve our understanding of mass support for political regimes. We already know that authoritarian regimes that can deliver material
benefits enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of vast portions of the people (Magaloni, 2006;
Rose et al., 2011). Similarly, voters in democracies are willing to let the president
bypass the legislature and court when they think that the economic performance
is strong (Singer, 2018). Yet, taking emotions into account, rather than limiting
ourselves to the study of material conditions, significantly broadens our perspective.
Emotions are responsive to various kinds of stimuli besides material conditions. Leaders spend a lot of time and energy to manipulate anger and enthusiasm (McDermott,
2018), and this is especially the case in aggrandizing regimes. Love and Windsor
(2018) demonstrate that Chavez’ discourse was filled with appeals evoking enthusiasm and anger. In most of his speeches, Erdogan aims to inflame feelings of his
supporters; famously, he once defended his rhetorical style saying that the anger was
an oratorical art.

9

Manipulative power of authoritarian leaders becomes especially

strong when they can control the media environment. Not surprisingly, Turkish politics is filled with partisan emotions. Research conducted before the repeat election
in Istanbul found that, for example, 70 % of AKP voters in Istanbul felt anger at
the opposition candidate, while 69 % of opposition voters felt anger at Recep Tayyip
Erdogan (Erdogan et al., 2019).
The experimental design of this study increases our confidence in the internal validity of the causal claims in this chapter. Finding similar results across two different
survey experiments, on the other hand, demonstrate that these effects can be generalized to the broader Turkish context. Yet, do these effects travel globally? Would we
see similar effects in other countries too? There are reasons to doubt that this is the
case. During the last decade, Turkey has turned into one of the most affectively polar9

http://www.gazetevatan.com/ofke-de-hitabet-sanati–161818-siyaset/
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ized countries in the world. Partisan identities are common and widespread (Laebens
and Öztürk, 2020). As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the AKP government has made
significant investments in spreading certain political narratives to reproduce partisan
emotions. This is not the case, however, in each country that experienced executive aggrandizement. In the next chapter, I demonstrate that manipulating partisan
emotions to gather support for executive aggrandizement is not possible in Bolivia,
another case of attempted executive aggrandizement.
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Chapter 3

LIMITS OF AFFECTIVE POLITICS: EVIDENCE FROM BOLIVIA

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that partisan emotions can help incumbents to build popular support for their authoritarian agendas. This chapter aims
to qualify and contextualize that finding. Incumbents’ manipulation of the affective
landscape is a central way in which affective politics is instrumentalized for democratic erosion. Yet, it is not an instrument that always works the way the incumbent
intends. Instead, the instrumental use of partisan emotions require the existence of
long-lasting affective political ties, most importantly in the form of partisan identities. Absent these ties, incumbents’ efforts to instrumentalize partisan emotions for
political gains might fall short of reaching the goal.
The rest of this chapter is formed of four sections. In the first section, I introduce Bolivia as a case of attempted executive aggrandizement. This section justifies
the case selection and describes the process of executive aggrandizement in Bolivia,
occurring under Morales’ rule, from 2006 to 2019. In the second section, I share my
findings from an survey experiment conducted in Bolivia before the 2019 presidential
election. This survey experiment follows the same design with the survey experiment
conducted in Turkey and presented in Chapter 2. In contrast to the results in Turkey,
however, I find that manipulating partisan anger does not lead to increased support
for autocratization in Bolivia. In the third section, I explain this divergence between
the results in Bolivia and Turkey with reference to weak partisan ties in Bolivia. In
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the last section, I discuss implications of this finding.
3.1 Bolivia as a case of failed executive aggrandizement
While Turkey is a case of successful executive aggrandizement, Bolivia, under Evo
Morales, is case of a failed one. Similar to Erdogan, Morales came to power in the
first decade of the 21st century. He adopted a populist rhetoric, he oversaw historic
rates of economic growth, and he used his executive power to establish control over
state institutions. He eventually attempted to lengthen his stay in power through
non-democratic means. All these similarities help us to use the Bolivian case to
contextualize our findings from the Turkish case.
Evo Morales came to power in 2005, winning the presidential election in the first
round -this was the first time in Bolivia’s democratic history that a candidate won
the presidential election outright. Starting from the beginning of his tenure in 2006,
Morales promised to transform the country. He pushed for a new constitution, which
was popularly approved in 2008. The new constitution let Morales to run for president for two more terms, beginning with the new presidential election in 2009. His
popularity, grounded in his political and economic successes, helped him to easily win
presidential elections in 2009 and 2014 with historic vote margins, as Figure 3.1, on
the next page, demonstrates. Under Morales, historically excluded groups in Bolivia,
such as indigenous people, had an opportunity to participate in the political system
of the country (Crabtree, 2020). Thanks to the commodity boom, Bolivian economy
caught fast economic growth rates and the MAS government, under the leadership of
Morales, channeled this new wealth to significantly improve living standards of the
Bolivian people.
Yet, Morales used his unprecedented popularity to aggrandize his executive power
and to lengthen his stay in power beyond the limits recognized in the 2009 constitu-
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tion. He gradually established control over state institutions, including the judiciary.
Media freedom was limited, and critical journalists faced with harassment (Anria,
2016). In 2016, the MAS government forced a national referendum, which would
allow Morales to run for presidency for the fourth time.
Morales probably thought that his electoral popularity would suffice for an easy
win. Yet, it turned out to be a close race between him and the opposition. Scandals
coming days before the vote, which included a corruption scandal and an arson attack on opposition-controlled municipal building, further harmed Morales’ credibility
(Achtenberg, 2016, 374). Eventually, Bolivian voters rejected Morales’ bid for one
more term, giving Morales his first serious electoral defeat. Compared to the presidential election conducted only two years ago, the vote for Morales had fallen by 20%
in the referendum.
Despite initially accepting the defeat, the ruling party later adopted a discourse
dismissing the legitimacy of referendum results based on the argument that people
were “duped” by the media (Lehoucq, 2020, 132). Morales and the MAS eventually
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decided to ignore the referendum result and to use their influence over the courts
to secure indefinite reelection. In November 2017, the Supreme Electoral Tribune of
Bolivia made the controversial decision that term limits violated political rights, and
it abolished the term limits altogether (Verdugo, 2019). This allowed Morales the
right to run for a fourth term in the 2019 presidential election.
As it is well known, this election did not end well for Morales. Morales’ troubles
were visible during the campaign period; credible election polls demonstrated that
he was unable to secure a comfortable vote margin that would prevent a run-off
with the main opposition candidate, Carlos Mesa. The initial results on the election
day also pointed to a second round. Then, some irregularities occurred during the
vote count. The official announcement that Morales had won the election in the first
round, avoiding the run-off with a margin less than 1%, satisfied neither the opposition
groups nor the international observers. Ensuing opposition protests turned violent
and costed many lives. The army eventually intervened, forcing Morales to resign
and flee the country.
3.2 Inability to provoke partisan anger in Bolivia
Both Turkey and Bolivia have recently gone through a period of executive aggrandizement during the last decade. Does this mean that the finding in Chapter 2, that
provoking partisan emotions helps incumbents build support for their authoritarian
agendas, applies to the Bolivian case? In order to test this argument, I conducted an
online survey experiment in Bolivia, right before the 2019 presidential election held
on October 20. Data collection started on October 1 and lasted until the election
day. I recruited participants through an international online panel company.

1

The design of this survey closely followed the design of the first survey in Chapter
1

The panel company is named Syno International. For more information, visit synoint.com.
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2, which was conducted in Turkey before the repeat election in Istanbul. The sample
was limited to those who had voted for Morales in the previous election or who
professed partisan ties to the MAS. I randomly assigned respondents to treatment
and placebo groups, and I asked respondents in the treatment group to write down
what makes them angry at the opposition parties. Respondents in the placebo group
wrote down what they usually did to feel relaxed. After the treatment, all respondents
answered the questions that measured their support for autocratization. To remind,
Morales was still president when this survey was conducted.
There are two differences between the design of surveys in Turkey and Bolivia,
which were necessitated by the institutional difference across these two cases. First,
Bolivia has a presidential system and candidates running for the presidential post are
not closely associated with a single political party. This means that “partisan anger
at the main opposition party” might not mean the same thing it means in Turkey.
For this reason, I formed a third group of respondents, who wrote down what made
them angry at the opposition candidate, Carlos Mesa. Findings from this third group
of respondents, presented in Appendix B, do not reveal any significant differences.
Second, in order to study the impact of emotions on attitudes towards executive
aggrandizement, it is necessary to ask questions about specific acts of executive aggrandizement in a given country, rather than measuring regime preferences through
abstract questions. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, partisan emotions do
not affect regime preferences but they shift attitudes towards acts of autocratization.
For this reason, I formulated new questions that are about the steps of autocratization
in Bolivia.
Let’s start with a manipulation check to discuss the findings. In Chapter 2, I
demonstrated that a self-writing task, in which I asked respondents to write what
made them angry about the opposition party, significantly increased anger at the
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opposition in Turkey. The most crucial finding from the survey in Bolivia is that this
simple design did not evoke partisan anger at opposition parties. Neither asking the
respondents to think about opposition parties nor about the opposition candidate led
incumbent voters to feel increased partisan anger. Table 3.1 below and Table B.1 in
Appendix B present these results.

Table 3.1: Manipulation check: Manipulating anger to right-wing political parties in
Bolivia
Anger

Anger
Full Model
Treatment: Anger to Opp. Part. 0.483
0.241
(0.519)
(0.755)
N
171
162
p-values in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

Fear

Fear
Enthusiasm
Full Model
0.625
0.549
-0.304
(0.390)
(0.464)
(0.729)
171
162
171

Enthusiasm
Full Model
-0.140
(0.874)
162

p < 0.001

This finding helps us to contextualize our findings from the Turkish case. It
seems that it is not always straightforward to evoke partisan anger at opposition
parties among incumbent voters.
In the second step of this research, I measure attitudes towards autocratization.
Following the design of the first survey experiment in Chapter 2, I ask respondents to
rate several statements on autocratization, which have varying degrees of abstraction.
Here are the statements:
• It was fair for the Supreme Electoral Tribune to permit Morales to run for one
more term, despite the opposition victory in the referendum.
• If MAS introduces new regulations to make it more difficult for opposition parties to win elections, such as limiting the campaign period, would you support
these regulations?
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• Candidates from the opposition should be allowed to organize an electoral campaign in my district.
• If opposition wins the next presidential election, the election should be repeated.
• It is necessary to ban candidates from opposition parties in the next election.
• When the times are difficult, it is justifiable that the President of Bolivia closes
the Legislative Assembly and governs without the Legislative Assembly.
• If it is necessary to continue the Process of Change in Bolivia, the President
can suspend the elections and govern without the Legislative Assembly.
Importantly, respondents saw these statements in a randomized order. Results
are presented in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Effects of anger towards right-wing opposition parties on attitudes towards
autocratization

DV: Fourth Term is Fair
DV: Limit opp. activities
DV: Permit opp. campaign
DV: Repeat elections if opp. wins
DV: Ban opp. candidates
DV: Executive coup is OK -1
DV: Executive coup is OK - 2
-1

-.5

0

.5

1

Controls: Age, Education, Income, Gender, Partisanship. CI:95
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Figure 3.2 demonstrates no consistent or significant effect of anger treatment on
attitudes towards autocratization. This finding diverges from findings in the Turkish
case, in which anger treatment caused shifts in attitudes towards autocratization.
Based on the Turkish case, we would at least expect a change in the first statement,
in which we asked attitudes towards Morales’ rejection of opposition victory in the
referendum. Yet, even in the first item, which is as concrete as possible, we do not
see any significant changes. The results do not change when we manipulate anger at
opposition candidate Carlos Mesa, rather than right-wing opposition parties. This
can be seen in Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
3.3 Explaining the failure to evoke partisan anger in Bolivia
I believe that the failure to evoke partisan anger in our survey experiment reflects
a general feature of Bolivian politics during the Morales era. During his tenure,
Morales used a rhetoric that could evoke emotional reactions. On the one hand,
he developed enthusiastic plans for the future of Bolivia and Bolivian people. He
promised a radical transformation when he first came to power, with respect to both
economic and political spheres (Weyland, 2009). A new constitution and the fight
against neoliberal institutions marked his transformative vision. Until the last days
in power, Morales kept his efforts to sustain this enthusiasm by framing his tenure as
a historical age for Bolivia, calling it the Process of Change (Proceso de Cambio) and
perpetuating his future vision through the Bicentennial Patriotic Agenda (Agenda
Patriótica del Bicentenario).
Morales also frequently used a rhetoric that could evoke negative emotions towards
the opposition. Most scholars group Morales’ regime as a populist regime, in the same
league with Chavez’s regime in Venezuela and Correa’s regime in Ecuador De la Torre
(2017). There are some features peculiar to Bolivia, such as the significant role played
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by social movements under Morales regime, which contradicts with the top-down and
personalistic politics in those countries (Anria, 2013). Still, there is an agreement
among scholars that Morales’ rhetoric was mainly centred around the discourse of
“social antagonism between the pure people and corrupt elites” (Mudde, 2017). He
combined this populist discourse with nationalist themes, claiming to represent the
Bolivian nation’s struggle against the anti-imperialist camp, headed by the USA.
Morales increased his populist tone during last years of his rule (Balch, 2019), and
he did not avoid using a demonizing language against the opposition, for example
accusing the opposition of receiving donations from the USA

2

and plotting coups

against the MAS 3 . Yet, despite his rhetoric laden with emotional references, Morales
lost more than one fifth of his voter support in the 2016 referendum and the 2019
election.
Why is it difficult to evoke partisan emotions in Bolivia, compared to Turkey? I
argue that a crucial difference between Bolivia and Turkey, which led to the diverging
outcome across these two cases, was the weakness of partisan identities in Bolivia.
As explained in Chapter 1, partisanship is a long-term affective linkage between the
party and the voter. Voters usually gain their partisan identities in early socialization
period, following their parents or other people around them. Once formed, partisanship functions as a group identity. The individual assigns superior moral attributes
to the partisan group and identifies with them, while denigrating voters of the rival
party (Rothschild et al., 2019). As such, partisanship carries politics beyond the
transactional logic and gives a moral content to it. Furthermore, identification with
a political party means that political developments that include a threat or a boon
to the party’s political status can now create emotional reactions (McDermott, 2018;
2

https://www.erbol.com.bo/nacional/evo-morales-dice-que-est%C3%A1-seguro-de-tener-dostercios-en-la-asamblea-legislativa
3

https://www.france24.com/es/20190913-evo-morales-golpe-estado-disturbios
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Huddy et al., 2018). Emotions follow the appraisal of threats and rewards in the environment, and these appraisals are especially likely if one identifies with a political
party. For these reasons, I argue, it is easier for politicians to evoke partisan emotions
in countries where partisan identities are common and widespread.
There is a large difference between Bolivia and Turkey with respect to the proportion of partisans, as it is demonstrated in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of partisans in Turkey and Bolivia
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The weakness of partisan ties in Bolivia deserves further explanation. On the one
hand, there are historical reasons behind it. Party system in Bolivia was in decline
throughout 1990s and 2000s. As Centellas (2009) put it, vote for the systemic parties
in presidential elections declined from 74 % in 1985 to 42 % in 2002 and 7 % in 2005.
Bolivia had five presidents between 2000 and 2006, two of which had to resign due
4

The exact numbers should be evaluated with caution. Scores for Turkey rely on the CSES
surveys, while scores for Bolivia rely on LAPOP surveys. There are some differences between the
wording of relevant survey items and the timing of these surveys, which are discussed in detail
in Appendix B. However, the overall finding that partisan ties are exceptionally weak in Bolivia,
especially compared with Turkey, survives this careful scrutiny.
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to popular protests and one for health reasons. These political instabilities erode
existing partisan loyalties.
Still, we would expect the strengthening of partisan identities at least during
the last decade, under the rule of Morales and the MAS. This was a period of elite
polarization (Crabtree, 2020; Handlin, 2018) and increased autocratization, which
contributed to the development of partisan ties in Turkey (Laebens and Öztürk,
2020).
It is important to consider the organizational structure of the ruling coalition to
explain this puzzle. From the very beginning social movements in Bolivia played a
leading role in the electoral victory of the MAS (Anria, 2018). The MAS was established as a large tent of social movements. Social movements within MAS protected
their institutional independence and, in Conaghan (2018, 242)’s words, “the primary
loyalties of members resided with their organization rather than MAS.” In contrast to
its electoral power, MAS was an institutionally underdeveloped organization. Social
movements, which were a part of MAS, did not avoid using contentious tactics when
they disagreed with Morales (Anria, 2018).
This can be contrasted to the Turkish case, in which the Islamist social movement
was decidedly defeated before the AKP came to power with a new political rhetoric.
This helped the AKP and Erdogan to easily monopolize the power within the ruling
bloc; members of the Islamist social movement felt grateful to Erdogan and the AKP
for this political victory.
Opposition form and behavior might have also played a role in the lack of widespread
affective political ties in Bolivia. Opposition was scattered and weak during most of
Morales’ presidency (Conaghan, 2018, 249). This prevents the possibility of a masslevel political polarization, which would then strengthen partisan identification with
parties. In line with their overall weakness, opposition actors in Bolivia usually
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avoided radical strategies that their counterparts in Turkey or Venezuela unsuccessfully tried (Cleary and Öztürk, 2020). Morales, despite his populist rhetoric, also
made some concessions during periods of heightened political crises in the first years
of his presidency.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, my goal was to show the conditions under which our findings
from the Turkish case would apply. The existing literature in political psychology is
focused nearly completely on advanced democracies. This results in faulty generalizations. The Bolivian case protects us from such a danger, revealing that provoking
partisan emotions and shifting voters attitudes in this way is not always an easy task.
Historical and institutional context matters. These issues are further discussed in the
Conclusion chapter of this dissertation.
Before concluding, we need to an important limitation to the empirical claims in
this chapter. I argued that diverging levels of partisanship between Turkey and Bolivia
is the cause of the difficulty of evoking partisan emotions in Bolivia. A strong test
of the relationship between partisan identities and partisan emotions would require
a statistical model with an interaction variable between partisanship and the anger
treatment. Without an analysis at the individual level, comparison of partisanship
scores between Turkey and Bolivia can only be suggestive. The problem is that,
however, this kind of a statistical model would require a much larger sample size,
especially given that the proportion of partisans is already low in Bolivia. Bolivia
is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, and online access is highly limited.
It took around three weeks, for example, to collect 260 respondents for this study.
Future research on this issue will need to rely on new strategies of data collection to
reach larger sample sizes in these contexts.
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Chapter 4

A CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION: AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION AND
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

In the previous two chapters, I relied on the analysis of individual-level data to
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, partisan emotions increase support for
executive aggrandizement among incumbent voters. In this chapter, I extend this
finding to cross-national context, relying on indicators aggregated at the country
level. This allows, most importantly, to study how political institutions and other
country-level phenomena impact the role of affective political ties during democratic
erosion.
With respect to the types of affective political ties, this chapter deals with affective polarization. This is, on the one hand, a necessity: the only survey item
that is available for large-N analysis of affective political ties is party and leader feeling thermometers, included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
database. But in addition to practical necessities, there are also theoretical gains
from the study of affective polarization. The worldwide increase in the level of political polarization and the dangers this poses to the health of democratic institutions
have recently become an issue of concern for many scholars (Somer and McCoy, 2019;
Svolik, 2019). This chapter contributes to these debates by focusing on the affective
side of polarization and exploring the conditions under which affective polarization
harms democratic institutions.
In following pages, I first review the literature on polarization and introduce the
distinction between affective and ideological forms of polarization. Building on these,
I theorize the conditions under which affective polarization may harm democracies.
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Most importantly, I argue that affective polarization harms democratic institutions
especially when voters are polarized over their affective reactions towards the ruling party. In the remaining part of this chapter, I call this form of polarization as
“affective polarization over the incumbent,” or shortly as “incumbent polarization”
when needed. This chapter also studies the close relationship between ideological and
affective ties and how this relationship is influenced by the institutional framework. I
argue that ideological polarization leads to affective polarization over the incumbent
especially when constraints to executive authority is weak. This is because ideological
differences become threatening especially when there are few institutional guarantees
to protect the losers of the election. I test these arguments using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project (CSES) and the Varieties of Democracy
Project. Empirical tests and robustness checks support my arguments.

4.1 Taking affective polarization seriously
The alarming trend in democracies, described in the Introduction chapter, has
renewed the interest in political polarization. Many scholars are convinced that increasing polarization was the driving force behind surprising developments such as
the 2016 presidential election in the United States, the rise of populist and extremeright parties in Europe, and the Brexit vote (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Schaffner
et al., 2018). Many scholars believe that polarization is the primary cause of democratic decline in countries such as Turkey, Venezuela, Poland, Hungary, and Thailand
(Kaufman and Haggard, 2019; McCoy et al., 2018). However, the empirical literature
on this relationship remains limited and inconclusive.
In the early literature on democratic breakdowns, there was a consensus that party
system polarization was one of the causes of democratic breakdown (Linz and Stepan,
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1978; Valenzuela, 1978). Relying on surveys from eight different European countries,
Sani and Sartori (1983, 308) demonstrated that low party system polarization correlated with better functioning democracies. Huntington (1993, 290) offered “extreme
polarization often produced by leftists” as an explanation of first and second waves
of democratic breakdowns. The general argument in all these studies was that as
political parties developed more disparate ideologies, located farther away from each
other along the left-right axis, it would be harder for these parties to work together.
This inability to compromise created political crises and power vacuum, inviting antidemocratic actors to the political scene. The emphasis on detrimental effects of party
system polarization still lasts in the literature on democratic decline (Capoccia, 2001;
Diamond, 2015; Kaufman and Haggard, 2019; Somer and McCoy, 2018).
On the other hand, a different literature developed especially in the last few years
point to a positive relationship between political polarization and democratic health.
Using first two waves of Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) surveys,
Wang (2014) demonstrates that party system polarization is positively correlated with
democracy scores, even after controlling for economic development, age of democratic
regime, and other institutional variables. Based on these regression results, Wang
concludes that political polarization actually promotes democratization. Through a
comparative historical research design, Bornschier (2019) demonstrates that stable
party systems with higher quality democratic institutions emerged in Latin America
only when ideological polarization has been sustained for a long enough time. Findings like these have led scholars to reach the vague conclusion that a certain degree
or some level of polarization was good for democracy, while excess was dangerous
(McCoy et al., 2018; Wang, 2014).
I believe that one of the sources of this problem with the existing literature is
that political scientists are not always consistent in what they mean with political
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polarization. Until the last few years, most scholars understood polarization predominantly as the ideological distance between political parties in a national party
system. This concept of polarization, defined as “party system polarization,” can be
traced back to Sartori (2005)’s discussion of polarized pluralism developed in 1970s.
There have also been studies on mass level ideological polarization, usually measured
through the self-placement of respondents over the left-right spectrum (Dalton, 2006;
Ezrow et al., 2014; Jou, 2016).
Affective polarization, as a concept that is distinct from ideological polarization,
has been absent in most of these discussions; but there are good reasons to take affective polarization seriously in comparative politics. Affective polarization is highly
correlated with partisan emotions, and, as discussed in Chapter 2, emotions can explain crucial forms of political behavior at the individual level. For example, anger
and enthusiasm encourage voters to participate in politics, offering a solution to the
collective action problem (Groenendyk and Banks, 2014). Emotions shape whether
individuals will engage in deliberative or partisan reasoning; angry voters are more
likely to follow partisan reasoning, while anxiety is associated with deliberative thinking (MacKuen et al., 2010). These individual level effects may aggregate in various
ways depending on the political and institutional context of a country, triggering
political change.
Furthermore, a lack of attention to affective polarization may significantly bias
cross-country comparisons of polarization. In many countries, political parties do not
differ significantly along policy ideas and political ideologies. This is especially the
case in new democracies with unconsolidated party systems. In these environments,
affective polarization towards parties and leaders may emerge as a better way to
capture political polarization, and ignoring this form of polarization may result in
downplaying levels of polarization in those countries.
59

4.2 Polarization and democracy: Hypotheses
In this section, I develop hypotheses on the relationship between ideological and
affective forms of polarization and their effects on democratic institutions. First, I
explore under what conditions political polarization has detrimental effects on democratic institutions, paying special attention to the elite behavior as the intervening
mechanism. Second, I explore the relationship between ideological and affective forms
of polarization, taking into account how political institutions mediate this relationship.
4.2.1 Affective polarization over the incumbent and democratic decline
I believe that the most immediate effects of polarization on democratic institutions
occur through the incentive mechanisms political polarization creates for elites, and
we need to consider which parts of polarization influences the elite behavior most.
In this respect, I suggest distinguishing affective polarization towards the party that
governs from affective polarization towards other parties. The latter is measured
through “mass affective polarization”, which takes feelings towards all parties into
account equally (Lauka et al., 2018). While this measure may be useful to explain
some political outcomes, I argue that, affective polarization towards the political
actor that controls the executive power has some unique effects over the trajectory
of democratic regimes.
Incumbents controlling the executive authority are the most powerful actors in
democratic regimes. In parliamentary systems, this actor is the ruling party. Ruling
parties, nearly always led by prime ministers, have significant powers over the legislative process, and they can use this power to push policy and institutional changes. In
presidential systems, incumbents are the presidents. Although presidential systems
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usually dictate a more strict separation of power, presidents still hold more power
than any other actor in the democratic system. Besides their control over the legislative process, incumbents have varying levels of control over the bureaucracy and
security forces. Some incumbents can even choose to misuse this power to create
unfair advantages for themselves in the electoral system (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Affective polarization over the incumbent is important for the health of democratic
regimes, I believe, because it has direct impact on what the incumbent will do with
executive power and how the opposition will react.
First, the increase in the proportion of voters having extremely negative affects
towards the incumbent may radicalize the behavior of the incumbent. We can expect
that increased hostility from the opposition voters will increase incumbent’s threat
perception: once the incumbent loses power, these opposition groups might support
judicial action against the incumbent. This can give the incumbent a reason to try to
stay in power as long as possible by manipulating or destroying electoral institutions.
In addition to this, the increased hostility by the opposition groups may convince the
ruling party leaders to cease any efforts of dialogue and negotiation with opposition
voters, thinking that there are not any votes to win there. McCoy and Somer (2019)
argue that Gezi protests in 2013 in Turkey had this effect by antagonizing progovernment groups and accelerating government repression. The Gezi protests in Turkey
revealed the extent of opposition animus towards Erdogan (Altun, 2016), pushing
Erdogan towards a more divisive rhetoric and more repressive policies (Bashirov and
Lancaster, 2018).
Second, the increase in the proportion of voters having extremely positive affects towards the incumbent may encourage aggrandizing behavior of the incumbent.
Recent research has demonstrated that voters may support authoritarian moves by
incumbents when they are strong partisans of the ruling party (Ahlquist et al., 2018;
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Graham and Svolik, 2020). Believing that their base will follow them under any conditions, executives having strong bonds with their followers will have the courage to
create institutional and economic crises to aggrandize their power, which will necessarily emerge as executives try to grasp more power. Balderacchi (2018) argues
that competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America emerged only when leaders with authoritarian intentions had strong personal bonds with their voters, and
leveraged these bonds against institutions constraining the executive power. For example, Chavez widely used emotional appeals to mobilize his followers, and relied
on this popular support to dismantle democratic institutions in Venezuela (Love and
Windsor, 2018; Levitsky and Loxton, 2013).
Finally, affective polarization over the incumbent can encourage opposition elites
to pursue non-democratic means against the incumbent. A strong dislike towards the
ruling party usually goes together with the delegitimization of the authority of this
party in the eyes of opposition voters and non-democratic political actors, such as
military and judicial bureaucracy. Such an environment is a breeding ground for conspiracies against the incumbent and democratic institutions. Military coup against
Thaksin in Thailand in 2006, which followed significant polarization of Thai polity,
is an example of this relationship between the affective polarization over the incumbent and the opposition-led democratic decline (Kongkirati, 2019). Once opposition
chooses to follow extra-democratic means, democratic breakdown may follow even if
these groups fail in their attack (Gamboa, 2017). These arguments bring me to my
first hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Affective polarization over the incumbent has a negative
effect on electoral democracy.
I do not expect other forms of political polarization to have such negative effects
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on democratic institutions since they are less directly related to the center of political
power. To start with, there is a long chain of causality between mass ideological polarization and political power. While one can argue that parties will respond to mass
ideological polarization by embracing more radical positions, many different factors,
such as electoral laws, can also play a role in shaping party decisions to form ideological platforms. Secondly, even if some political parties sincerely embraced extreme
ideological positions, as it is the case in party system polarization, this does not necessarily mean that those parties, and their supporters, will have the opportunity to
disrupt the democratic equilibrium. Unlike cases of high level of affective polarization
over the incumbent, in which executive is the center of polarization, actors driving
party system polarization may actually be peripheral to political power. In addition
to this, ideological forms of polarization may not have detrimental effects of affective
polarization, such as creating a loyal support base that is more willing to bear the
burden of disruption of democratic equilibrium. When it is not accompanied by emotions, ideas’ mobilizing force may be rather limited (Goodwin et al., 2009). Finally,
mass affective polarization should be weakly, if at all, related to democratic decline
because this measure takes feelings towards opposition parties into account and these
feelings are not directly related to the behavior of most important political actors, as
it is explained above.
4.2.2 Party system polarization and affective polarization over the incumbent
Does this mean that party system polarization, which has been studied extensively in the literature on democratization, is unrelated to democratic health? As I
discussed in the introduction, there is a large literature listing potential positive and
negative effects of party system polarization on democratic institutions. If this really
is the case, we need to distinguish between mechanisms through which party system
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polarization shows its negative and positive effects, rather than attempting to reveal
the average treatment effect of party system polarization. I argue that affective polarization over the incumbent may be relevant here by mediating the negative effects of
party system polarization on democratic institutions. Increased ideological distance
between political parties harm democracies because it increases affective polarization
over the incumbent. This may be the case, for example, when the ruling party has
an extreme ideological position over the left-right continuum. In this scenario, ideological polarization will be transferred to the incumbent as ideological distance may
fuel affective responses (Lauka et al., 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016).
HYPOTHESIS 2: Party system polarization is associated with the affective
polarization over the incumbent.
I believe that political power plays a role in shaping the relationship between
affective and ideological polarization too. If incumbency is a special position because
it holds political power, party system polarization should especially lead to affective
polarization over the incumbent when incumbents in a country has more political
power. I argue that the impact of party system polarization on affective polarization
over the incumbent is especially high when constraints to executive authority are
weak. When executive power is checked through other authorities (legislative body,
bureaucracy, or judiciary), the ideology of the governing party may not matter a lot.
However, as the checks over the executive authority weaken, the executive authority
becomes more able to create large scale changes in the society. In this political climate,
there are more reasons for people to develop strong emotions towards the incumbent.
Below is the hypothesis summarizing this point:
HYPOTHESIS 3: The relationship between party system polarization and affective polarization over the incumbent becomes stronger when there are fewer
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constraints on executive power.
4.2.3 A general model: polarization and democracy
I have so far argued that party system polarization does not have a net effect on
democratic institutions, but it can have negative effects mediated through the affective polarization over the incumbent. If this is the case, we should see party system
polarization’s positive effects on democratic health once we control for the affective
polarization over the incumbent. In other words, I argue that party system polarization has a dual effect on democratic institutions. First, it has an indirect and negative
effect occurring through the affective polarization over the incumbent. Second, it has
a direct positive effect on democratic institutions occurring independently from the
affective polarization over the incumbent. Political scientists have already listed these
positive effects of party system polarization on electoral democracies (Carlin et al.,
2015; LeBas, 2018; Lupu, 2015; Maoz and Somer-Topcu, 2010). As McCoy et al.
(2018) summarize them, polarization facilitates party building, constituency mobilization and stabilization, simplifies choices for voters, and helps consolidate political
party systems (McCoy et al., 2018). Once we control for the affective polarization
over the incumbent, statistical analysis should reveal these positive effects. Figure
4.1 below presents a summary of the model that I suggest.
This model is a partial mediation model (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Mathieu and
Taylor, 2006), as affective polarization over the incumbent partially mediates the
relationship between party system polarization and electoral democracies. What is
different from most partial mediation models studied in the literature is that the
indirect relationship occurring through effect C and A has a negative effect on the
dependent variable, while the direct relationship occurring through effect B has a
positive effect. To summarize:
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Figure 4.1: Forms of polarization and democracy: Theoretical model

HYPOTHESIS 4: Party system polarization has a negative effect on electoral
democracy, which is mediated through the affective polarization over the incumbent.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Party system polarization has a positive effect on electoral
democracy, which occurs independently from affective polarization over the incumbent.
4.3 Data and tests
To test these hypotheses I am using election surveys included in the CSES dataset.
By June 2018, 174 different surveys from 55 countries were included in the CSES
online database (Quinlan et al., 2018). All of these surveys are conducted in general
election years, and mostly in parliamentary election years. Unfortunately, not all
election surveys are useful to measure affective polarization. I had to drop 32 election
surveys from the sample because they did not include relevant feeling thermometers.
This leaves us with 142 surveys from 49 countries. In 14 countries, we have only
one election survey. In 8 countries, we have two election surveys. In remaining 27
countries, we have three or more surveys. There is a considerable amount of variation
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regarding democracy and economic development scores across countries included in
this sample.
The data I use for this research has a clustered nature: country-years are nested
in countries. Thus, observations from the same country correlate with each other.
This correlation between observations from the same country violates the assumption
in OLS regression models that residuals are independent from each other, and cause
incorrect standard errors (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 2). In order to deal with
this problem, I use mixed effects models in all stages of this study. It is important
to underline that mixed effects models used in this article stay within conventional
limits of minimum required sample sizes, especially because I do not estimate random
components and inter-level interactions in any of these models (Huang, 2018; Maas
and Hox, 2005; Scherbaum and Ferreter, 2009; Theall et al., 2011). All variables
of interest are first level variables, and all models have around 120-140 observations
at the first level. To maximize statistical power and minimize biases, I estimate
my models using restricted maximum likelihood with Kenward-Roger method, as
recommended by McNeish and Harring (McNeish and Harring, 2017). In one of the
robustness checks, I cluster standard errors, using ordinary least squares estimation
method.
In order to measure party system polarization, scholars locate parties along an
ideological continuum, extending from extreme right to extreme left. Then, party
polarization score is calculated as the total of each party’s distance to the system
mean, parties being weighted according to their vote shares (Dalton, 2008, 905).
Dalton’s operationalization of party system polarization, based on CSES dataset,
has been widely used in comparative politics literature during the last decade, and I
follow the same operationalization.
1

1

In order to locate parties along the left-right

See, for example,Adams et al. (2012); Curini (2015); Dalton and McAllister (2015); Ezrow et al.
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axis, we may use party manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project, expert
surveys, or citizens’ perceptions, as they are measured in CSES surveys. Following
Dalton, I use citizens’ perceptions of parties left-right positions. This helps me to
avoid losing any observations, since other polarization measures also come from the
same CSES dataset. More importantly, this is theoretically more relevant, since I
expect ideological polarization to have an impact to the degree that voters perceive
these changes.
In American politics literature, scholars usually measure affective polarization
through feeling thermometers. In the two-party context of American politics, it is
quite straightforward to calculate affective polarization: they simply subtract one’s
feeling thermometer score for two parties. In order to measure affective polarization in the context of multi-party systems, Lauka et al. suggest using party feeling
thermometers included in CSES surveys.(Lauka et al., 2018, 114) After recording the
ratings of each respondent for up to nine most important political parties in the party
system, they code 0, 1, and 2 as strong dislikes, and 8, 9, and 10 as strong likes. The
formula they use based on this coding is presented below:
P9
M ass Af f ective P olarization =

Lip ∗ Dpi
0.25 ∗ N
i=1

In this formula, Lp is the proportion of people strongly liking a party, Dp is the
proportion of people strongly disliking each party, and N is corrected number of
effective parties. Because people are able to like more than one party, the maximum
score per country would be 0.25 times the number of parties (as half the population
at each end of the spectrum would represent 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25). For this reason, they
divide the outcome by 0.25.
(2014); Zechmeister and Corral (2013).
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In order to operationalize affective polarization over the incumbent, I mainly follow the formula suggested by Lauka et al. to measure mass affective polarization in
multiparty democracies.(Lauka et al., 2018) I start with the same party feeling thermometer question included in CSES surveys. I group voters reporting their feelings
towards the incumbent as 0/10, 1/10, 9/10 and 10/10 as extreme voters. These voters are one standard deviation outside of the mean value of the entire CSES sample
regarding their feelings towards the incumbent. I multiply the proportion of voters
having extremely positive feelings towards the incumbent (9/10 and 10/10) with the
proportion of voters having extremely negative feelings towards the incumbent (1/10
and 0/10). In order to fix the maximum possible value of the polarization over incumbent affects to 1, I divide the result of this multiplication by 0.25. Thus, a polity
in which half of the voters have extremely negative feelings towards the incumbent
while the other half harbor extremely positive feelings will have a score of the affective polarization over the incumbent, or shortly“incumbent polarization score,” of 1.
If none of the voters have extreme feelings towards the incumbent, the incumbent
polarization score will equal 0. Below is the formula of this operationalization.
Responses to Feeling Thermometer
Proportion of Voters in This Group
Quality of Voters in This Group

0 1
a b
extreme

Incumbent P olarization score =

2 3 4 5 6 7 8
c d e f g h i
mean one std. dev.

9 10
j k
extreme

(a + b) ∗ (j + k)
0.25

This formula prioritizes principles of bimodality and extremeness in operationalizing political polarization.

2

Extremeness is included in the measure of polarization

2

See, Fiorina and Abrams (2008). As explained above, Lauka et al.’s operationalization include
voters reporting their feeling as 8/10 or 3/10 within the group of polarized voters. They do not
give an explanation of why they take 3 and 8 as cutoff. I think it is theoretically more justified to
set this boundary to one standard deviation away from mean voters. Voters reporting their feelings
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through the counting of voters at extreme poles. The more voters locate themselves
at the extreme poles in their feelings to incumbents, the higher affective polarization
over the incumbent is. Bimodality is included in the measure of polarization through
the multiplication of extreme poles. As a result, the more voters are distributed
evenly across two poles, the higher the affective polarization over the incumbent is.
A required step to calculate the levels of affective polarization over the incumbent
is to determine which political actor holds the executive power in each case. CSES
surveys are conducted in election years. Regardless of the timing of the survey,
affective polarization over the incumbent, or incumbent polarization score, used in this
study measures polarization of affects towards the political actor that governed after
the election. Thus, incumbent polarization scores demonstrate affective polarization
towards the incumbent at the beginning of their tenure, right after a general election.
Regression models are designed to take this aspect into account. In the Appendix, I
provide a document listing the ruling parties and presidents for each observation of
the dataset.
Most of the countries included in CSES surveys have parliamentary regimes. If
a country has a parliamentary regime, I define the ruling party as the incumbent,
and I measure polarization of feelings towards that party. If there is a coalition government, I measure polarization of feelings towards the biggest party in the coalition
government, which is usually the party of the prime minister.

3

If it is a presidential

as 0, 1, 9, and 10 are outside of one standard deviation of mean, hence extreme feeling voters.
Furthermore, it is better to have a narrower definition of extreme voters to produce more effective
measures. This decision does not significantly change regression results in this work, as it it can be
seen from Robustness Check 3 in the Appendix.
3

I checked whether including other coalition parties in the measurement of incumbent polarization makes a difference. I calculated incumbent polarization score for each party in the coalition
government, and I weighted these scores in proportion to seats each party in the coalition had in
the parliament. The assumption was that number of seats in the parliament corresponds to the
executive power a party in the coalition government has. This weighted aggregate measure of affective polarization over the incumbent does not change results in any significant way, mostly because
smaller partners in the coalition usually have much fewer seats than the biggest party in coalition.
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regime, I determine the president as the incumbent, and I measure polarization of
feelings towards the president. In other words, in presidential countries I use the feeling thermometer for presidents, not presidents’ parties.

4

Semi-presidential regimes

are in the gray area. In these regimes, I use party feeling thermometers because I
want to maximize data availability.

5

In order to operationalize the health of core democratic institutions, I use electoral
democracy index from the V-Dem dataset. This index aims to capture “the core value
of making rulers responsive to citizens achieved through electoral competition for the
electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and
civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by
fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief
executive of the country”. (Coppedge et al., 2018) I use this index as it fits best with
my theoretical focus on the competitiveness aspect of democracies. For party system
polarization variable, I use Dalton’s index provided in the CSES website. (Dalton,
2008) In cases where Dalton does not provide party system polarization score, I
calculate party system polarization scores based on the formula provided by Dalton.
I calculate mass ideological polarization and mass affective polarization based on the
formulas presented in this article and Lauka et al.’s article(Lauka et al., 2018) The
data on GDP per capita comes from the Maddison Project.(Bolt et al., 2018) I use
CSES dataset for the regime age variable. This variable counts years passing since
For this reason, I chose the simplest way, and limited the analysis to the biggest party in coalition
governments. The only exception is Switzerland, in which an executive council governs the country. In Switzerland, incumbent polarization score is weighted according to the number of executive
council members per party.
4

This is a necessity because political parties are usually much weaker in presidential regimes, and
it is the president who controls the executive power.
5

It is possible that all these nuances create some impact over the magnitude of incumbent polarization score. For this reason, I control for presidentialism in some of the regression models. I find
that the statistical relationship between democracy scores and incumbent polarization scores does
not change according to the decision of including/excluding presidentialism in the analysis.
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transition to democracy. Table 4.1 on the next page presents descriptive statistics of
these key variables. Now we can start with the test of Hypothesis 1:
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Incumbent Polarization Score
Party System Polarization
Mass Affective Polarization
Mass Ideological Polarization
GDP per capita
Democracy Score
Regime Age

142
155
162
169
164
160
160

0.11
3.23
0.21
0.04
28067.68
0.81
47.5

0.08
1.25
0.11
0.06
14279.25
0.13
46.52

0.00
0.44
0.10
6.07
0.00
0.78
0.00
0.44
2877.00 79894.00
0.18
0.93
0
203

HYPOTHESIS 1: Affective polarization over the incumbent has a negative
effect on electoral democracy.
In order to test this hypothesis, I use a mixed effects model with random intercepts
and lagged dependent variable. I am using random intercept model, which allows only
the intercepts, not slopes, to take random values; this helps to keep things simple and
maximize statistical power. I am using lagged values of dependent variable as a control
variable in order to alleviate concerns of endogeneity and autocorrelation. This type
of model is also called as a dynamic model in the sense that the dependent variable
is modeled as the result of an update of past values of the dependent variable with
the effect of independent variables.(Wilkins, 2018; Keele and Kelly, 2006, 4) I regress
democracy scores at time t + 3 over independent variables, controlling for democracy
scores at t-1. Note that I choose the time lag between two democracy scores as four
years, which is close to an election period.
I use three groups of control variables. The first group is called the basic group.
This group includes GDP per capita and regime age. Second group includes institutional variables: party fragmentation, proportional election system and presidential
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regimes. Third group includes social variables: population, ethnic fractionalization
and religious fractionalization. Results are presented in Figure 4.2 on the following
page. All values on the regression table are standardized.
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0.16
(0.11)
-0.03
(0.08)
-0.24***
(0.05)

Regime Age

GDP per capita

Incumbent Polarization

Observations
132
142
141
144
131
141
141
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All values are standardized.

143

-0.13
(0.09)
130

Population

-0.21***
(0.05)

-0.06
(0.08)

0.17
(0.12)

0.38***
(0.06)

0.14
(0.10)

-0.05
(0.08)

-0.21
(0.15)

-0.15**
(0.05)

0.06
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.07)

0.12
(0.16)

0.18***
(0.04)

Religious Fractionalization

0.16
(0.09)

0.07
(0.09)

-0.26***
(0.07)

-0.13*
(0.06)

0.01
(0.09)

0.19
(0.12)

0.48***
(0.06)

-0.19
(0.10)

0.09
(0.11)

-0.09
(0.15)

-0.17**
(0.06)

-0.00
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.09)

0.26
(0.17)

0.19***
(0.05)

Social1

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.13
(0.08)

Proportional System

-0.27***
(0.05)

-0.00
(0.08)

0.14
(0.08)

0.07
(0.04)

-0.02
(0.07)

0.17
(0.11)

0.44***
(0.06)

Presidentialism

-0.06
(0.05)

0.00
(0.09)

0.08
(0.16)

0.20***
(0.04)

Effects over Democracy Scores at t + 3
Basic4
Inst1
Inst2
Inst3
Ins4

-0.16*
(0.07)

0.03
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.09)

0.18
(0.13)

0.48***
(0.06)

Basic3

Party Fragmentation

Mass Ideological Polarization

Mass Affective Polarization

Party System Polarization

0.19***
(0.05)

0.44***
(0.06)

Democracy at t-1
0.21
(0.17)

Basic2

Basic1

-0.27
(0.14)
140

0.24
(0.15)

-0.39**
(0.14)

0.00
(0.05)

-0.06
(0.09)

0.24
(0.17)

0.17**
(0.05)

Social2

-0.21
(0.11)
139

0.12
(0.11)

-0.25*
(0.11)

-0.04
(0.05)

-0.07
(0.09)

0.26
(0.14)

0.37***
(0.06)

Social3

-0.19
(0.13)
142

0.20
(0.15)

-0.38**
(0.14)

0.06
(0.04)

-0.03
(0.07)

0.12
(0.16)

0.19***
(0.04)

Social4

Figure 4.2: Affective polarization over the incumbent and democracy: Regression results

Unsurprisingly, democracy score at t-1 emerges as the most significant determinant
of democracy score at t+3. GDP per capita and regime age do not have significant
impacts over democracy score at t+3, probably because their effects can be seen only
in the long term and we control for long-term effects by using the lagged dependent variable as a control variable. Party fragmentation, a political variable that can
have an impact over the short term, has consistently significant and negative effect
on democratic health, on the other hand. Among polarization variables, incumbent
polarization score emerges as the only variable that can explain the decline in democratic health. The effect is statistically significant at 0.001 significance level across
all three models. This effect is substantively significant too. 1 standard deviation
increase in the incumbent polarization score causes a decrease in democracy score
around 0.25 standard deviation across all three models. The effect of mass affective
polarization has also a negative sign, however this effect is not significant at 0.10 significance level in two of the three models. We should keep in mind that this variable
includes incumbent polarization too, so the negative sign may simply be a result of
this. Finally, party system polarization and mass ideological polarization do not have
any significant effect across all three models. Below, Figure 4.3 shows the effect of
incumbent polarization on electoral democracy score.
Figure 4.3: Marginal effects of affective polarization over the incumbent on the democracy score at t+3
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To make sure that findings of this article are robust to different model specifications, I conducted five different robustness checks. Regression tables from these
tests are presented in Appendix C. All robustness checks include variations of the
main regression test presented above. In the first robustness check, I used Polity
and Freedom House scores as dependent variable, instead of electoral democracy index from V-Dem. The negative effect of affective polarization over the incumbent
becomes even more substantial and significant with these dependent variables. In
the second robustness check, I used different temporal specifications in the dynamic
model. Rather than regressing democracy scores at t+3 over democracy scores at t-1,
I regressed democracy scores at t+2 over democracy scores at t-1, democracy scores
at t+3 over democracy scores at t, and democracy score over t+4 over democracy
score at t. The effect of affective polarization over the incumbent is weakest, in terms
of coefficient size, when we attempt to predict democracy score at t+2. This must
be because the negative effects have not yet accumulated enough by the end of the
second year after elections. Even in this case, however, all models are significant
at 0.05 significance level. In the third robustness check, I used a slightly different
operationalization of affective polarization over the incumbent. Rather than defining
extreme feelings as 0, 1, 9, and 10, I defined extreme values as 0, 1, 2, 8, 9, and
10. This operationalization is the same with Lauka et al. (2018)’s operationalization.
Coefficient sizes of incumbent polarization score are slightly smaller because this operationalization is less successful at distinguishing extremely polarized voters from
moderate voters. However, coefficients are still significant at 0.01 significance level
across all three models.
The last two robustness checks use different statistical models. In the fourth
robustness check, I clustered standard errors, instead of modeling standard errors
through a mixed effects model. As expected in the literature, this reduces the statis76

tical power of the model, hence a general increase in standard errors (Cheah, 2009;
McNeish and Harring, 2017). Incumbent polarization score is significant in only one
out of three models; other polarization variables are not significant in any of the
models. Still, affective polarization over the incumbent seems to be a better predictor than other polarization variables. In the fifth robustness check, I used a fixed
effects model. This creates a more conservative test, limiting sources of variation to
observations from the same country. Using this fixed effect model reduces explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable because we completely limited variation
to within case analysis. Affective polarization over the incumbent is still statistically
and substantially significant; in all of the three models, incumbent polarization score
is significant at 0.01 significance level, effect sizes ranging from -0.16 to -0.21. None
of the other three polarization variables reach these significance levels.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Party system polarization is associated with higher levels of
affective polarization over the incumbent.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The relationship between party system polarization and affective polarization over the incumbent becomes stronger when there are fewer
constraints on executive power.
In order to test these two hypotheses, I again used a mixed effects model with random intercepts. To measure constraints to the executive authority, I used ‘executive
constraints’ variable of Polity IV. According to Coppedge et al. (2018), this variable
refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers
of chief executives. These limitations include those imposed by any ‘accountability
groups’ (i.e. legislatures, ruling party, councils of nobles, the military, judiciary). I
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used this variable as it covers all forms of constraints; my argument does not distinguish between different forms of constraints. Other control variables include GDP per
capita, regime age, party fragmentation, ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and population. GDP per capita may decrease affective polarization over
the incumbent because a certain level of material wealth may decrease the worry of
people about power politics (Przeworski, 2009). Regime age may increase incumbent
polarization score because party cleavages and partisanship will be more established
in these democracies (Rokkan et al., 1967). Party fragmentation may decrease affective polarization over the incumbent because when more parties are included in the
political system, it may be harder to establish an antagonistic front in the form of us
versus them. Finally, higher ethnic fractionalization may be related to higher levels
of affective polarization over the incumbent because ethnic differences create potential for emotional appeals in the society (Cederman et al., 2013; Fjelde and Höglund,
2016). For robustness check, I ran the same model replacing Polity variable with two
variables from V-Dem dataset with more specific content: legislative constraints on
the executive power and judicial constraints on the executive power.
Regression results, presented on the following page, demonstrate that party system polarization is the most significant determinant of incumbent polarization score.
Furthermore, this effect is especially strong when constraints to executive authority
are weak. Both the “political constraints” variable from Polity dataset and “legislative constraints” variable from V-Dem dataset have a significant impact over the
relationship between party system polarization and affective polarization over the incumbent. The ‘judicial constraints’ variable from V-Dem also has the same sign, but
it does not reach 0.05 significance level (p value: 0.14). Below are two graphs that
demonstrate how political constraints variables shape the relationship between party
system polarization and affective polarization over the incumbent:
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Figure 4.4: Determinants of affective polarization over the incumbent: the role of
executive constraints (Polity)
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Figure 4.5: Determinants of affective polarization over the incumbent: the role of
legislative constraints (V-Dem)
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Figure 4.6: Political institutions and affective political ties: Regression results

Determinants of Incumbent Polarization
General

Legislative

Judicial

GDP per capita

-0.026*
(0.011)

-0.024*
(0.010)

-0.016
(0.010)

Regime Age

-0.002
(0.013)

0.002
(0.012)

0.003
(0.012)

Presidentialism

0.013
(0.011)

0.018
(0.010)

0.009
(0.010)

Proportional System

-0.008
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.009)

-0.004
(0.009)

Party Fragmentation

-0.001
(0.008)

-0.001
(0.008)

-0.002
(0.007)

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.024*
(0.010)

0.017
(0.010)

0.017
(0.009)

Religious Fractionalization

-0.014
(0.010)

-0.009
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.009)

Population

0.018
(0.011)

0.011
(0.010)

0.020
(0.010)

Party System Polarization

0.119**
(0.041)

0.101***
(0.027)

0.075**
(0.029)

Constraints (Polity)

0.036
(0.021)

Party System Polarization # Constraints (Polity)

-0.014*
(0.006)

Legislative Constraints

0.126
(0.114)

Party System Polarization # Legislative Constraints

-0.089**
(0.032)

Judicial Constraints

-0.125
(0.079)

Party System Polarization # Judicial Constraints

-0.051
(0.034)
Observations
128
134
134
Log lik.
150.314
165.814
170.689
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All values except those in interaction
are standardized.
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As an additional robustness check, I test this same model clustering standard
errors, rather than using a mixed effects model. As it is presented in Appendix C
(Robustness Check 6), results do not change. The interaction of party system polarization with executive constraints and legislative constraint variables are significant
0.01 significance level. The interaction between party system polarization and judicial
constraint, on the other hand, has a p value of 0.076.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Party system polarization has a negative effect on electoral
democracy, which is mediated through affective polarization over the incumbent.
HYPOTHESIS 5: Party system polarization has a positive effect on electoral
democracy, which occurs independently from affective polarization over the incumbent.
I have argued that affective polarization over the incumbent mediates negative
effects of party system polarization on electoral democracies, and party system polarization has positive effects on democratic institutions when controlled for affective
polarization over the incumbent. Testing the statistical significance of the indirect
effect of party system polarization on the democracy score, occurring through affective polarization over the incumbent, requires the test of the entire model (Danner
et al., 2015). I conduct this analysis using two-level mediational structural equation
model, which allows a more powered and flexible test of mixed effects mediated models (Gunzler et al., 2013; Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004; Stata et al., 2011). Following
previous models, random intercepts are introduced for each countries. Democracy
score at t-1, GDP per capita and regime age are used as control variables. On the
next page, Figure 4.7 summarizes results from this analysis.
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Figure 4.7: Forms of polarization and democracy: Results from mediation analysis

Results demonstrate that both hypotheses hold. The size of the indirect effect is
relatively small compared to the direct effect, but still significant with a p value of
0.001.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have extended the study of affective political ties to more than
fifty countries through cross-national statistical analysis. My results are in line with
findings from the first two empirical chapters: strong affective partisan ties weaken
democratic institutions. However, this study also informs us about the conditions
under which we are most likely to see these effects.
My findings demonstrate that polarization is especially perilous when it occurs
in the form of affective polarization towards the party holding the executive power.
Ideological differences, on the other hand, harms democracies to the extent that
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they drive affective polarization towards the ruling party. Political institutions plays
a role here too, by moderating the relationship between party system polarization
and affective polarization over the incumbent. When there are strong constraints to
executive authority, ideological differences are less likely to feed affective polarization.
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Chapter 5

ORIGINS OF AFFECTIVE TIES: A NARRATIVE BASED APPROACH

In the preceding chapters, I have extensively discussed how the strength of affective
political ties, especially of those directed towards the ruling party, might threaten
democratic regimes. These findings necessarily lead to questions on the origins of
affective political ties. Where do these ties come from? How do political parties and
leaders establish affective bonds with their supporters? How are these affective ties
reproduced over time?
An understanding of the origins of affective political ties is necessary to reach a
fuller account of the instrumental use of affective political ties by incumbents during
periods of democratic breakdown. Existing political science literature offers several
mechanisms in this regard, focusing on early socialization (Converse, 1969), party
organization and civil society density (Samuels and Zucco, 2015), and charismatic
leadership (McDonnell, 2016; Sy et al., 2018). These are all conducive to the cultivation of affective political ties, yet, I believe that one of the most important sources of
affective politics goes largely unnoticed in the existing literature: political narratives.
A focus on political narratives can especially be useful to understand the affective
landscape in countries with younger and weaker democratic institutions. Study of
political narratives will also help us to see how various forms of affective political ties
can work in tandem, supporting and strengthening each other.
Narratives are sequential stories, bringing selectively framed events from past and
present together with visions of future, and cast along a dramatic form (Bottici,
2007; Hammack and Pilecki, 2012; Kølvraa, 2016). They play a crucial role in the
construction and solidification of collective identities because they take groups of
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individuals as their subjects (Klar and Baram, 2016). Through their dramatization
of the history, they provide the sense of historical significance to individuals, who
identify as members of those groups (Bottici, 2007; Chernobrov, 2016), and they
evoke affective reactions in individuals gripped by them. Political narratives, built on
the historical agency of political groups, strengthen affective political ties. Probably
nationalism is the most potent source of political narratives in the modern ages.
Populist narratives have also emerged as a globally influential narrative during the
last decade (Skonieczny, 2018; Ungureanu and Popartan, 2020).
In this chapter, I focus on the Turkish case to reveal how a less studied form
of political narratives, which I call “utopian developmentalist narratives”, can play
a significant role in the formation of affective political ties. I argue that the AKP,
a political party that is less than twenty years old, benefited from developmentalist
narratives to establish affective bonds with voters close to the party for sociological
or economic reasons. This narrative promised a bright vision of future to the AKP
voters, and it offered them a role in the “historical transformation” that the AKP had
instigated. The grandiosity of developmentalist promises and the enjoyment offered
by these promises aroused AKP voters. The AKP was inviting its voters to be a part
of this historical transformation; most of its voters accepted this offer, and they felt
proud for being a part of it. Increased identification with the AKP and Erdogan,
partisan enthusiasm, and anger at the main opposition party (CHP) for criticizing
these attempts ensued.
The rest of this chapter is formed of four sections. First, I take a closer look at the
affective landscape in Turkish politics, with the goal of demonstrating exceptionally
strong affective political ties between the incumbent party, AKP, and its voters. In
the second section, I develop the concept of “utopian developmentalist narratives.”
The third and fourth sections provide empirical evidence on the role of utopian de85

velopmentalism in Turkish politics. In the third section, I demonstrate the central
place of the developmentalist narrative in the AKP discourse. In the fourth section,
I demonstrate that AKP supporters’ engagement with this narrative evokes affective
reactions.
5.1 The strength of affective political ties in Turkey
Since coming to power in 2002, the AKP and its leader Erdoğan relied on strong
popular support to change the political system of Turkey into an authoritarian regime.
Although the AKP experienced various political and economic crises during this period, it has managed to keep a firm grip on its partisans’ hearts and minds, emerging
unscathed from all those crises.
Quantitative and cross-national indicators document the strength of affective partisan ties between the AKP and its voters. For example, let’s take a look at the
feeling thermometer score, which is widely used to study voters’ affective reactions to
parties (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019). Figure 5.1 relies on the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) survey conducted in Turkey after the 2015 General
Election.
Figure 5.1: AKP voters feelings’ towards the AKP

Figure 5.1 demonstrates that around 60 % of AKP voters rated their feelings
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towards the AKP as 10/10 — the highest possible rating. This is a quite high proportion, and this becomes more clear when we compare the AKP to prominent political parties in other countries. Below, in Figure 5.2, I compare the average feeling
thermometer score of AKP voters to the voters of the most popular parties of other
countries included in CSES Module 4. The AKP is only second to Thailand’s Pheu
Thai Party in this comparison.

Figure 5.2: Incumbent voters’ feelings towards the incumbent in CSES Module 4

One can also provide some qualitative indicators of the strength of affective ties
between the AKP and its voters, such as the collective resistance of AKP supporters
against the coup d’etat in 2016 (Esen and Gumuscu, 2017) or the stability in the
AKP’s vote share across two decades despite radical shifts in the AKP’s policies.
The origins of strong affective partisan ties to the AKP is an interesting puzzle
in itself. While exceptionally high levels of political polarization (Lauka et al., 2018),
Erdogan’s charisma (Erisen, 2018), or the AKP’s populist rhetoric (Aytaç, 2014;
Selçuk, 2016) may be some of the reasons why AKP voters have developed strong
affective ties, I believe that we should also acknowledge the role of utopian narratives
within the AKP discourse. As I demonstrate it below, developmentalism has held a
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central place in AKP’s public discourse since 2011 (Paker, 2017); yet, it went largely
unnoticed in the relevant literature due to the emphasis on the AKP’s Islamism and
populism.
5.2 Utopian narratives and developmentalism
Narratives, as defined above, are sequential stories, bringing selectively framed
events from past and present together with visions of future, and cast along a dramatic form. Utopian narratives are political narratives in which the promise of a
bright future is the most emphasized theme within the sequential structure of the
narrative. Scholars of utopian studies define “utopia” with regards to the content,
form, or function (Levitas, 2010). My understanding of utopian narratives is blind to
the content of the utopia — there can be communist, fascist, or neoliberal utopian
narratives. Similarly, unlike most of the critical scholarship on utopias, I do not make
any assumptions regarding the political function of the utopia. Utopias may serve
existing power relations in the society, or they can play transformative roles. Utopian
narratives do not require that the utopian content provided a fully-fledged alternative
social model (Kenny, 2007). Instead, much like all other narratives, utopian narratives tie together particular interpretations of events from the past and present with a
vision for the future (Geoghegan, 2007). What distinguishes utopian narratives from
other narratives is the predominant role of this vision of the future within the overall
narrative and its unique character.
The narrative of future gains a utopian character when it promises its audience
unfamiliar pleasures that will be realized through radical changes in the audience
environment. Utopian narratives, by definition, promise a vision of the future in
which the individual, who is the target audience of this narrative, will live in joy.
Importantly, this promised vision of future is radically different from the individual’s
88

current environment. Utopian political designs do not promise to correct things
gradually; they promise to build a new world from scratch. For example, utopian
narratives include designs of a new law or a new social order. Going further, these
designs may even aim to create “the new human” (Dalakoglou, 2012; Humphrey,
2005; Overy, 2005). These depictions of the future as a radical break from today
promise a joyful experience that is not similar to what the individual has been used
to in a daily life. Utopian narratives rather promise an experience that exceeds the
boundaries of everyday experience, analogous to what Lacanian psychoanalysts call
jouissance (Glynos, 2001; Hook, 2017; Kølvraa and Ifversen, 2017). This combination
of radical unfamiliarity and joy, in the form of the promise of unfamiliar pleasures,
relates utopian narratives to affective reactions.
Developmentalism is the most common form of utopian narratives within the context of mass politics. It may be helpful to distinguish between routine developmental
policies and developmentalist utopian narratives to clarify what developmentalism
means as a political narrative. Developmental policies and projects, as a set of largescale initiatives that aim to improve the quality of life, are part of routine political
discourse in many countries. As governments undertake large-scale developmental
projects, they boast about those projects and their contributions to the society. Yet,
these policies usually do not signify more than their instrumental purposes: improving the quality of life. They are characterized with the rational logic of cost-benefit.
They stay local and isolated in the overall government discourse. These policies are
articulated independently from other policy spheres, such as foreign policy, domestic
policy, economic policy, and trade policy. They are not tied to a selective reading of
past, present and future.
Developmentalist political narrative emerges when the goal of development gains
the central place within the overall political discourse. This means that “develop89

ment” becomes the nodal point of the political discourse, fixing the meaning of all
other signifiers (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Thus, for example, trade policy, industrial policy, foreign policy, or education policy are no longer
independent from each other; instead, they are now all tied to the issue of development. In addition to this, developmentalist goals can be linked to a series of events
in past and present within the narrative framework. For example, developmentalist
goals may be articulated as the rebirth of past glory; “Make America Great Again”
exemplifies this. “Development” may be articulated along with conspiracy theories;
hence, current underdevelopment can be explained as a result of external or internal
enemies. Finally, developmentalist narrative may be linked to a collective identity.
For example, developmentalism went together with nationalism in many developing
countries during the post War period (Desai, 2008).
Clear descriptions of the coveted social order is a common feature of all utopian
accounts, and this equally applies to developmentalist utopian narratives. Providing
detailed descriptions of the promised future helps the audience to imagine the future
more clearly and get excited with this vision of the future. As different from some
other utopias, however, the promise in developmentalist utopias is predominantly
about increased opportunities of production and, especially, consumption (Inden,
1995). In addition to detailed descriptions of developmentalist goals, temporal references can also help turning “development” into an object of desire. Determining a
specific temporal point for the realization of developmental goals, rather than framing development as a gradual process, creates the location of “unfamiliar pleasures.”
This rhetorical move increases the appeal of the utopian promise through closure; the
affective investments of the audience are now focused on a specific temporal point,
rather than being diffused over the process.
Like all other utopian narratives, developmentalist narratives arouse the audience
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gripped by its promises. Goal congruence is central to the evocation of emotions,
as discussed in Chapter 2, and developmentalist narratives define grandiose goals.
In addition to this, the political nature of these narratives may assign positive and
negative valence towards political actors. Among voters believing in developmentalist
narratives, potentially because of the ideological, economic, or sociological proximity
to the actor spreading them, these narratives will evoke partisan enthusiasm for this
actor. Furthermore, to the extent that utopian narratives are articulated along with
partisan group identities or conspiracy theories, they should evoke negative emotions,
such as partisan anger and hatred, at rival political actors. As discussed in Chapter 2,
we feel anger when an actor intentionally harms us. When opposition parties criticize
developmentalist projects, attempting to forestall them through various means, they
will be the object of partisan anger.
Examples of political actors employing developmentalist utopian narratives to secure popular support can be found in both democratic and non-democratic contexts.
A well-known example from democratic regimes is the Targets Plan of Juschelino
Kubitschek, the president of Brazil from 1956 to 1961 (Maram, 1990; Ioris, 2012).
Kubitschek’s developmentalist program was formulated as a utopian narrative. His
political campaign was centered on the promise of historic economic growth, and
utopian appeal was strengthened with a temporal reference: “fifty years of development in five years.” This promise was accompanied by detailed descriptions of
ambitious developmental goals, the most famous of which was building a new capital
city, Brası́lia. These rhetorical moves concretized “development” and turned it into
an object of desire. “A jump of fifty years in future” or “a capital city that will
be built from scratch” promised supporters a break from today’s world, and filled
them with enthusiasm and excitement (Maram, 1990). As this utopian narrative has
been rooted among Brazilians, it made Kubitschek one of the most popular Brazilian
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presidents ever.
Various authoritarian regimes also frame developmental goals in a utopian fashion
to build popular legitimacy and to mobilize their support base (Weitz, 2015). The
developmentalist urge of Stalinism is clear in Stalin’s these words: “We are fifty or
a hundred years behind the advanced countries and we can make good this distance
in ten years.” This belief in a bright future survived the de-Stalinization period, as
symbolized with Khrushchev’s famous phrase “Whether you like it or not, history is
on our side. We will bury you.” Achievements of the Soviet system in space missions
helped spreading this mood among the public (Derluguian, 2005, 90). Similarly,
the Maoist regime’s political mobilization campaign, “The Great Leap Forward,”
relied on utopian characteristics to mobilize emotions of euphoria and enthusiasm
among supporters (Liu, 2010, 353). As Liu puts it, the Maoist regime described its
communist utopian vision with great detail, claiming that this utopian future was
fast approaching.
5.3 Developmentalist utopian narratives in the AKP discourse
The AKP defined economic development as one of the goals of the party since its
establishment in 2001, as the full name of the party clearly demonstrates: “Justice
and Development Party.” Yet, during its first years in power, “development” stayed
as a routine policy area, as defined above. In this early period, lasting from the
AKP’s coming to power in 2002 to AKP’s second electoral victory in 2007, the AKP
followed IMF conditionality, Western-centric foreign policy and democratic discourse
(Hale and Ozbudun, 2009). After 2007 general election, however, the party started
to follow different policy lines, marked with increasing self-confidence. With regards
to the economic policy, for example, the AKP rejected to renew IMF agreements
in order to avoid budgetary constraints. Similarly around these years, AKP elites
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started to put more emphasis on becoming a regional leader in the old Ottoman
geography (Fisher Onar, 2011; Saraçoğlu and Demirkol, 2015). Finally, the AKP
became less interested in branding itself as a force for democracy and freedom, and
instead it shifted its focus on the construction of large-scale infrastructural projects
that would transform Turkish economy (Paker, 2017). In the campaign period of
the 2011 general election, AKP leadership articulated these moves around a coherent
popular narrative, which is defined in this dissertation as a developmentalist utopian
narrative. From that point onwards, the party and its leader Erdoğan heavily invested
in the spread of this narrative.
A study of the 2011 election campaign can help us to see the AKP’s developmentalist utopian narrative in its most articulate form. In order to study this election
campaign in a systematic way, I focus on one of its parts that can represent the whole
well enough: election posters. The central party organization of the AKP produced
36 election posters for this election to be used nationally. These posters were circulated all around the country, advertised on the media, and placed on billboards.
When taken together, I believe, these posters provide a representative picture of the
message AKP elites wanted to give in this election campaign. As I analyze these
posters below, my method is to reveal and interpret predominant themes that are
repeatedly stated across these posters.
To start with, there are two groups of posters, differing with respect to their shared
slogans, design, and content. The first group of the posters is about past successes
and services of the government; the second group introduces promises for the future.
Posters in the first group total 15 posters; and, they all carry a common slogan,
i.e. “it was a dream; it came true,” in addition to slogans unique to each poster.
An example is provided in Figure 5.3.
1

1

Some of the alleged past services of the

On the left, in red and bold fonts, it reads “we also have fast train now.” On the right, in white
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government, which were described in these posters, included cheap credits, increased
social spending, agricultural subsidies, free textbooks for schoolchildren, improved
health services, the first national aircraft, the first national satellite, and high-speed
rail. It can be inferred that these posters’ primary goal is to address daily economic
concerns by referring to improvements in government services. On the other hand,
however, the notion of “a dream coming true” and the expressed pride in producing
objects of technological superiority, such as a satellite and an aircraft, reveal the
developmentalist mindset behind the 2011 election campaign.
Figure 5.3: Election Posters - Past services

Posters in the second group, on the other hand, are much more directly focused
on the goal of establishing a developmentalist narrative. These posters specify a
temporal location for the utopia, provide detailed descriptions of the promised future,
and articulate “development” as the nodal point of the entire AKP discourse.
To start with, all of the posters in this group are branded with the slogan “Turkey
is ready; Target 2023”, which provide a temporal focal point for the AKP’s developmentalist utopian narrative. Through this slogan, AKP promises a complete transformation of Turkey by 2023. 2023 is the centenary of the modern Turkish Republic;
fonts, it reads, “we introduced high-speed rails to Turkey”. Below, it reads “it was a dream, it came
true.”
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hence, this slogan carries a strong symbolic element to it. The 2011 election was
the first time the AKP adopted “Target 2023” as a party slogan, and this was the
most widely used slogan throughout the entire election campaign. Whenever Erdoğan
made a campaign speech, for example, “Target 2023” was written on the background.
TV commercials of AKP broadcast right before the election started and ended with
this same slogan. Erdoğan himself referred to this slogan many times in his speeches.
After the 2011 election, “Target 2023” continued to be one of the main slogans of the
party, and a common reference point among party members from all ranks.
“Target 2023” has played a central role for the construction of the utopian narrative in two ways. First, specifying 2023 as the target year was the constitutive
step that created a well-defined location for the promised utopia. As I have put it
above, “development” gains utopian characteristics when it is articulated as a concrete object. Specifying 2023 as the target year produced this “object of desire”,
distinguishing 2023 from the area of routine politics. In one sense, the period of familiar environment was supposed to end in 2022, and, 2023 was constructed as the
abode of new pleasures. Second, “Target 2023” functioned as the nodal point of the
AKP discourse, as it linked disparate policy spheres to the developmentalist promise.
Thus, foreign policy, trade policy, education policy, or developmental policies were
no longer isolated policy areas that were characteristically different from each other.
Instead, as they were articulated through the slogan “Target 2023,” all these policy
areas turned into related nodes of the overarching developmentalist project. One
year after the 2011 elections, for example, the AKP prepared a 70-page document
listing 2023 goals in various policy areas (AKP, 2012). Ministries prepared their own
documents listing their goals for 2023.
The analysis of election posters in the second group reveals the content of the
AKP’s utopia: a developmentalist utopia that largely relied on the construction of
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large-scale infrastructural projects. Apart from their economic logics, these infrastructural projects aimed to impress supporters with their grandiose designs. The star
of these projects was an artificial water leeway to be constructed between the Black
Sea and Marmara Sea. The AKP proudly introduced this project as the “magnificent project”. “Two new cities to Istanbul, one is in Europe, one is in Asia,” “3rd
Bridge and 3rd Airport to Istanbul,” “Rail Tunnel under the Bosphorus,” “500,000
new houses,” and “22 huge city hospitals” were some of the other construction based
promises that were introduced in election posters. An example of election posters in
the second group is provided in Figure 5.4.

2

Figure 5.4: Election Posters - Future promises

In addition to construction based promises, there were also posters that combined
the developmentalist logic with nationalist themes, promising to improve Turkey’s
standing vis-à-vis advanced countries. The promises of domestic fighter aircraft and
domestic helicopter, for example, combined the goal of industrialization with an appeal to militarism. Two election posters included promises that directly pit Turkey
against other countries of the world: “one of the ten biggest economies in the world”
and “one of the five biggest economies in the world in the agriculture.” Each of these
2

on the left, it reads “3rd Bridge and 3rd Airport to Istanbul.” Below, it reads “Turkey is ready,
Target 2023.”
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promises was widely advertised in the pro-AKP media. One can take a look at the
pre-election commercials broadcasted on television to get a sense of the developmentalist framing of these advertisements (AKP, 2011).
Developmentalist slogans and promises produced in the 2011 election campaign
became the core theme in the AKP’s party narrative after 2011. As these slogans
and promises were articulated together with selected events from past and present,
a fully-fledged narrative structure emerged. AKP leaders frequently referred to this
narrative to interpret political events. For example, when the AKP faced one of
the biggest crises of its history in 2013, i.e., Gezi protests in Istanbul attended by
hundreds of thousands of citizens, AKP used the developmentalist narrative to frame
this event. Party leaders argued that these protests were designed and supported
by foreign states to prevent Turkey from reaching its 2023 goals. An analysis of the
official propaganda video produced and circulated by AKP during the Gezi Protests
documents these arguments (AKP, 2013). The title of this video can be translated
as “The Grand Plot: See the Real Face of Gezi Events, My Turkey.” The video starts
with the claim that the month before the Gezi protests erupted was the brightest
month of the entire history of modern Turkey. Then, the size of investments made
during that May is shown on the video one by one: “the biggest airport: 22 billion
euro,” “3rd bridge on Bosphorus: 2.5 billion euro,” “Channel Istanbul: 10 billion
euro,” “2nd nuclear reactor: 22 billion euro,” “interests at the lowest: 4.6 %.” In the
following parts of the 27-minute video, coverage of the events in foreign media outlets
is presented as the proof that Gezi Events were planned by “domestic and foreign
enemies that want to stop the growing Turkey.” AKP leaders continuously repeated
all these points as they talked about Gezi protests, and it seems that AKP supporters
bought these claims. Public surveys conducted during that period show that around
80 % of AKP supporters believed that Gezi protests were really planned by some
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foreign conspirers (Konda, 2014, 35).
5.4 How AKP supporters engage with developmentalist narratives
In this section, I explore how AKP supporters engage with the utopian developmentalist narrative, emotionally and discursively.
Empirical study of popular emotions is not easy, as emotions are fleeting bodily
reactions to a real world stimulus. In Chapter 2 and 3, I used self-writing tasks to
study partisan emotions. This method is convenient for the purpose of conducting
an experiment. Yet, non-natural evocation of emotions in this method can harm
interpretative analyses. In this chapter, I follow a different method to study affective
partisan ties, and I use video data analysis.
Video data analysis provides researchers with a special opportunity to observe
emotional reactions directly (Collins, 2009; Nassauer and Legewie, 2019), and this
method is increasingly used in various fields such as sociology (Nassauer and Legewie,
2018) and human geography (Laurier, 2016). In this study, I use online reaction videos
that demonstrate us AKP supporters’ emotional and discursive engagement with the
utopian narrative. To establish a systematic structure for analysis, I limit my study
of reaction videos to a single situation (first physical encounter with a symbol of
utopian narrative), a single location (Osman Gazi Bridge, a suspension bridge over
the Marmara Sea), and a single temporal period (all videos were recorded during the
first week after the bridge was officially opened in July 2016).
Building a suspension bridge over the Gulf of Izmit was one of the promises that
the AKP made during its 2011 election campaign; hence, this bridge is a symbol of
the utopian narrative. The bridge was named after the founder of Ottoman Empire,
Osman Gazi, indicating symbolic significance attached to the bridge within the AKP
narrative. The Osman Gazi Bridge was opened on June 30, 2016, with the ceremonial
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drive of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over the bridge. Although long suspension bridges
were not new to Turkey -there are two suspension bridges over Bosphorus that were
opened in 1973 and 1988-, construction of the Osman Gazi Bridge was presented as a
remarkable success by AKP leaders and supporters. During their first drive over the
Osman Gazi Bridge, some AKP supporters recorded reaction videos via their smart
phones in order to share this “historic experience” on social media. These reaction
videos comprise the material of this study.
As I searched YouTube content for this study, I came across 72 reaction videos
that fit with the properties listed above: They were recorded by ordinary people
driving over the Osman Gazi Bridge during the first week of its official opening.
These reaction videos can be classified into three groups with respect to their utility
for this research. The first group, the most useful for this research, includes videos in
which people talk and express their feelings and thoughts. I found thirty videos of this
type, and stopped looking for further videos at this point. The findings of this study
predominantly rely on this group of videos.

3

In Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, presented

on the next page, I provide screenshots from a typical video. In the second group of
videos, video recorders broadcast partisan music (marches with strong rhythms and
symbolic lyrics), but there is no talk. I found sixteen videos of this type. Although
these videos do not include any speech, the musical content suggests that supporters
recording these videos were aroused and excited by the encounter with the bridge.
Finally, the third group of videos includes neither talk, nor partisan music. Although
titles or descriptions of these videos in YouTube usually include some partisan slogans,
their content is not useful for the analysis of affective ties.
In interpreting these videos, I explored discursive and affective themes shared
across different videos. As I analyzed affective themes, I studied both subjective
3

URL links of these videos can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 5.5: Screenshot image from an example video

Figure 5.6: People shooting the example video
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descriptions of the emotional state, such as “I am very proud today”, and vocal characteristics of speeches, such as higher levels of pitch or frequent use of exclamations
and interjections (Mauss and Robinson, 2009). As I analyzed discursive themes, I
looked for narrative characteristics as introduced in the theory section above. For
example, I wanted to see whether supporters talked about the bridge as a service
that improves the quality of everyday life or as part of a narrative theme linking the
past and the present with the future.
It is important to note that these individuals in the videos may not represent
the entire AKP electorate. It is quite possible that these are core partisans, who
had already developed strong affective ties towards the AKP for reasons different
from AKP’s developmentalism. On the other hand, I argue that the emotional and
discursive reactions that we see in these videos are quite genuine. All of the videos
analyzed here were recorded by ordinary citizens; they were not produced by the
party organization or a media company. Thus, a study of these videos allows us to
explore a specific type of engagement with developmentalist utopian narratives.
In the following two subsections, I separately present my findings from the analysis
of affective and discursive content of these videos.
5.4.1 Affective content: Arousal, partisan enthusiasm, and partisan anger
To start with, these videos demonstrate that encounter with the Osman Gazi
Bridge strongly arouses AKP supporters. This is clear in expressions of awe, repeated words of exclamation and injection, heightened voice, and increased attention
to the environment. For example, the use of colloquial Arabic-origin words expressing amazement, such as “Allah Allah,” “Masallah,” “Subhanallah,” and “La ilahe
illalllah, Muhammeden Resullullah”, is common; we can see these in seven of these
videos. A typical example is: “Oh my God, look at that, oh my God, oh my God,
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what is this beauty, what is this beauty, there can be no such thing!” In another video,
we hear: “Hey Maasallah, hey Maasallah, look at that, look at that.” In eight other
videos, there exist repeated use of exclamation words, such as wow, hey, ay, ulan.
As AKP supporters constantly repeat words of surprise and shock, they express their
inability to believe what they see. In four other videos we see chanting or singing. In
others, some stressed words and higher levels of pitch reveal the arousal of supporters.
These moments of arousal are followed by enthusiastic praises of the bridge. Some
supporters in the videos carefully explore parts of the bridge, and then tell others
in the video how long the bridge is, how impressive the pillars are, how smooth the
asphalt is, or how sophisticated the workmanship is in a quite excited tone. In one of
the videos, the driver is so amazed that he starts praying, which lasts for more than
two minutes.
Arousal goes hand in hand with partisan emotions. Nearly all of the thirty videos
from the first group include partisan references; only in three videos do we not hear
any explicit partisan material. An interesting finding is that supporters overwhelmingly mention Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the constructer of the bridge and express
their gratitude to him; in twenty one videos we see direct mentions of Erdoğan. Supporters in these videos refer to Erdoğan either with his first name, Tayyip, or with his
nickname, reis, meaning “the leader.” There are several videos in which supporters
repeatedly chant his name: “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” One
of the supporters goes so far as praying to God to take from his life and give it to
Erdoğan. Another one thanks God for sending Erdoğan to them. Yet another thanks
Erdoğan’s mother for giving birth to him. As high arousal is coupled with high valence, emotions of enthusiasm, joy, and thrill become quite clear in these videos. We
hear references to the AKP in six videos, yet these are much less emotionally laden.
This suggests that partisan affects evoked by the utopian narrative are associated
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more clearly with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, rather than the AKP. Another striking
indication of this affective condition, i.e., high arousal and high valence, are videos
with partisan marches. In nearly one third of all videos, AKP supporters play high
volume, fast tempo, strong rhythm partisan marches as they drive over the bridge.
Another interesting finding from these videos is the frequent expression of negative
emotions towards opponents of the AKP. In total, eighteen of thirty videos include
references to the opposition party or its supporters. Hatred and anger, rather than
fear, are the most visible negative emotions in these videos. During the videos,
supporters quickly transition between their praises towards the AKP and insults
towards opponents. As they transition from praise to insults, their voice increases
and their speech becomes emphatic. Stressing each word, they narrate how much
harm opponents caused to the nation throughout history. More than half, i.e., 17 out
of 30, of these videos include insults to the opposition supporters, such as “traitors,”
“dishonorable people,” “ungrateful people,” “vampires exploiting the country,” and
“enemies of the people.” Several supporters say that they do not want CHP supporters
to use the bridge since they were against the bridge. One goes farther, wishing that
CHP supporters using the bridge fell into the sea and died. Several supporters, i.e.,
4 out of 30, make fun of CHP supporters for criticizing the bridge’s construction.
5.4.2 Discursive content: Utopian vision, historical significance, collective identity
A discursive analysis of these reaction videos shows that the Osman Gazi Bridge
is more than a bridge for the supporters in these videos; it is a symbol of the AKP’s
political narrative. Certainly, there are various references to direct material benefits
of the bridge to individuals. In thirteen of thirty videos we hear references relying on
everyday cost-benefit analysis, such as the new bridge’s positive impact on the traffic
congestion problem. Videos including references to a narrative framework, however,
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comprise more than half of all videos.
To start with, there are several direct references to the AKP’s utopian developmentalist narrative. Most strikingly, some supporters refer to “2023” as they encounter
the bridge. For example, feeling enchanted, one of the supporters says: “This is not
the half of it; wait until 2023.” Some others try to imagine the level of development
that the bridge will bring. One says, “There will be another Istanbul here.” In another video, we hear “You know what, I cannot even imagine how this area will be
in ten years time.” Indicating how all developmentalist promises are closely tied to
each other, some other supporters start talking about other ongoing infrastructure
projects: “Let’s leave this aside. Third airport. Again, in Çanakkale, a huge new
bridge at the length of 3800 meter is being constructed.” Along with the imagination
of future development, we also see many people entertaining the current level of development that became possible under the AKP rule: “They [parties before AKP]
could not even build a canal bridge, now they [AKP] are building a bridge over the
sea.”
As mentioned above, developmentalist narratives refer to the most advanced countries in the world to concretize the promise of development. Looking at the bridge
through this narrative perspective, AKP supporters in these videos feel the need to
compare the Osman Gazi Bridge with those in Europe and the United States. Several
speakers remind viewers that this is the fourth longest bridge in the world. A kid,
after his mother asks her what she thinks about the bridge, responds: “This is our
pride in the world.” In one of the videos, the driver, who has a relatively calm tone,
asks another passenger in the car: “How did you find this in comparison to those in
Europe?” Some others are more thrilled: “Wow, are we in Europe? Is this Frankfurt
or London?” asks one. Finally, there are those who are sure that the United States
and Europe would not be able to build a bridge like this: “Even America cannot do
104

this, they will go crazy now.” exclaims yet another one.
As they drive over the bridge, people in these videos feel that they are experiencing
a historical moment. Given that producing the feeling of historical significance is
a crucial function of narratives (Bottici, 2007; Stavrakakis, 2002), this shows how
the AKP’s developmentalism functions as a narrative. For example, in one of the
videos mentioned above, a mother tells her kids that this is a day to be told to their
grandchildren. In many videos, supporters thank God for showing these days to them:
“My God, thank You for sending Tayyip [Erdoğan] to us so that we could see these
days.” They cannot believe that they are really are driving over that bridge: “Oh
my God, were we supposed to see these days?” This feeling of historical significance
is usually coupled with a counterfactual narrative; several people tell that others
[supporters of opposition parties] would not see this day even in their dreams. “They
[opponents of AKP] told it was impossible, but it [the bridge] happened,” says one.
Finally, there is a strong element of partisan group identity in these videos. Frequent insults to AKP opponents, for example, suggest that opponents are seen as a
coherent group, different from AKP supporters (Iyengar et al., 2012). Partisan groups
are historicized as some AKP supporters argue that supporters of the CHP used to
exploit Turkey before the AKP came to power. A quite interesting finding, which
comes across several times in the videos, is that AKP supporters call this bridge “our
bridge”, distinguishing it from bridges over Bosphorus built by previous governments.
Some even say that “their bridge” is better than the others. Thus, one can see that,
AKP’s utopian narrative is articulated along with narratives of the past in a way that
strengthens perception of coherent groups (Scuzzarello, 2015, 182).
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed the role of utopian narratives in shaping the affective
landscape in Turkey. First, I defined utopian and developmentalist narratives and
explained how these narratives are related to affective reactions. Building on this, I
demonstrated that the AKP heavily invested to establish a developmentalist utopian
narrative. Through video data analysis, I also explored how AKP partisans engage
with this narrative. This analysis revealed that the experience of utopian narratives is
an affective experience, filled with arousal, positive emotions towards Erdoğan and the
AKP, and negative emotions towards opposition supporters. The narrative themes
accompanying this affective experience include bright future, historical significance,
and collective identity. From a broader perspective, this chapter offered a political
framework that can explain how incumbent parties can establish affective ties with
their voters. This complements Chapter 2, in which I discussed how affective ties may
influence incumbent voters’ reasoning during periods of executive aggrandizement.
There are two important questions that go beyond the scope of this dissertation
and are left for future research. First, the research design in this chapter is not
suited to reveal what proportion of AKP supporters affectively react to the AKP’s
developmentalist narrative. Second, the empirical discussion is only limited to the
case of Turkey, hence this paper does not provide a comparative perspective that
can be used to explore historical and political conditions behind the emergence of
developmentalist narratives. Answering these questions is necessary to evaluate the
full extent of political narratives’ influence.
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Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation relies on political psychology literature to explain the role voters’ feelings play during periods of democratic backsliding. In combining two distinct
fields of study, political psychology and political regimes, it offers novel insights in
both areas. In this last chapter, I summarize the contribution of this dissertation,
and I suggest directions for future research. The chapter is organized around three
themes: Affective political ties as an umbrella concept, taking context into consideration when studying political affects, and democracy and political affects.

6.1 Affective political ties as an umbrella concept
Political science literature has largely shaped around the assumption of rational
voters. Until the last two decades, emotions did not have a place even in the political
psychology literature (Brader and Marcus, 2013). As a result of this, our knowledge
on the role of affects in politics stays limited. An especially important shortcoming
is that most of the literature is limited to the context of advanced democracies. This
dissertation extends the geographical and substantial focus in the political psychology
literature. As we climb the ladder of abstraction, however, it is necessary to develop
new terms that can travel across countries and contexts.
In order to develop a broader framework to study affective politics, I offered
to use “affective political ties” as an umbrella concept. As explained in Chapter
1, this concept brings together all forms of psychological attachments that include
positive or negative valence towards a political actor, be it a political party or a
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leader. Affective political ties should be contrasted to clientelistic, ideological, or
programmatic political ties, which are all characterized with a transactional logic and
material expectations from the political actor.
“Affective political ties” refers to a broad range of affective attachments, and
it is necessary to study how these attachments are related to each other as well.
An important distinction between affective political ties is the object of affective
attachment. In this dissertation, I studied affective partisan ties: partisan identities,
partisan emotions, and affective polarization. However, affective ties to the leader,
which is called charismatic ties, also play a significant political role, especially in
countries with less developed party systems. Chapter 5, in which I explore origins
of partisan ties, offers some insights on the relationship between charismatic ties and
partisan ties. Analysis of video recordings demonstrate that when AKP supporters
refer to Erdogan, they express a higher level of affective arousal, compared to their
references to the AKP. It might be the case that charismatic ties in Turkey underlie
partisan affects that we have discussed in the context of Turkey. We need more
research to reveal how partisan and personalistic affective ties are related to each
other.
6.2 Taking the context into consideration when studying political affects
As mentioned above, the existing literature on emotions and partisan identities
have mainly been limited to the context of advanced democracies. Yet, these countries
have unique political and institutional features, such as well-established party systems
and liberal democratic institutions guaranteeing minority rights. A necessary task
ahead of us is to explore how political, social, and institutional contexts shape the
effects of affective political ties. This dissertation offers important insights in this
sense.
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In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how partisan emotions can lead to support for
executive aggrandizement among incumbent voters, even when these voters still prefer democratic regimes over autocratic ones. Importantly, however, our analysis in
Chapter 3 demonstrated that this finding does not travel to Bolivia, another case of
attempted executive aggrandizement. I explained this difference with respect to the
difference in the strength of partisan identification across countries, arguing that existing partisan ties makes the evocation of partisan emotions easier, which then have
unique effects on individuals’ reasoning during periods of democratic erosion. This
comparison demonstrates that we should be careful when generalizing from survey
experiments, and findings should always be contextualized. Turkey is currently one of
the most affectively polarized countries in the world (Lauka et al., 2018), with levels
of partisanship higher than the oldest democracies (Laebens and Öztürk, 2020). The
current intensity of the affective ties in Turkey makes it easier to evoke consequential
emotional reactions from voters.
This finding is line with what Phoenix (2019) shows through the comparison of
racial groups in the United States: groups can differ in whether they will react to
certain stimulus in an emotional way and what kind of political behaviors their emotional reaction will lead to. Emotional reactions are built on enduring collective
goals, expectations, and narratives. As we study affective reactions across different
countries, there is no reason to assume that we will reach straightforward universal
generalizations. Instead, we should constantly explore how contextual factors condition the effects of affective political ties. This is not an easy task. Few cross-national
surveys include survey items that can be used to study affective political ties in depth,
and statistical tests that include interaction effects require large sample sizes that are
difficult to collect in less developed countries. Still, political scientists do need to take
the context into account before making any kinds of general inferences about affective
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ties.
Chapter 4 also offered important insights on the role of context in shaping the
relationship between the strength of affective political ties and democratic erosion.
Unlike Chapter 2 and 3, this chapter relied on the analysis of aggregate data from
more than 50 countries. This allowed us to take into account the role of institutional
and aggregate level variables as well. First, our analysis in this chapter demonstrated
that mass affective politics harm democracies only when voters are polarized over their
feelings to the incumbent party. Affective polarization towards the opposition party
does not have the same influence with affective polarization towards the incumbent
party. Another interesting finding from this chapter was the role of constraints on
the executive. Ideological polarization leads to affective polarization especially when
contraints to executive authority is weak. This finding suggests that one way to keep
affective polarization under control is to establish a system of checks and balances that
guarantee a certain degree of power-sharing among winners and losers of elections.
6.3 Democracy and political affects
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on democratic erosion by
documenting some of the negative impacts of affective political ties on democratic
institutions.
The literature on political regimes, which explore questions such as democratization, democratic breakdown, and mass support for authoritarianism, have been silent
about the role of political affects for a long time. Most scholars in the literature relied
on economic explanations to understand these processes (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006; Magaloni, 2006), and only recently scholars are applying emotions to explore
mass support for authoritarianism (Marcus et al., 2019). My dissertation contributes
to this emerging literature by demonstrating the need to focus on political affects to
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understand the role of mass behavior during periods of executive aggrandizement. In
Chapter 2, I documented that incumbent voters are more likely to support steps of
autocratization when they feel anger at the opposition party or enthusiasm for the
ruling party. When incumbent voters lose their enthusiasm, for example because they
think about the problems the country is going through, they withdraw their support
for aggrandizement. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that when voters polarize over
their feelings towards the ruling party, what follows is democratic decline.
My findings should not lead to the conclusion that strong affective ties are always
detrimental to democratic institutions or that incumbents can easily manipulate partisan affects to promote their authoritarian agendas.
To start with the latter, there are strong limitations to the discursive power of
incumbents. Chapter 3 discussed historical and institutional limitations in Bolivia,
which resulted in weak partisan ties. Even in Turkey, however, the AKP government
cannot always rely on partisan emotions to sustain its rule. Emotions do not last
forever; human beings are quite capable at regulating their emotions and adjusting
their expectations. Arguably, partisan anger can reproduce itself to a certain extent,
through the incivility of partisan groups towards each other. This is especially the
case when partisanship is rooted in deep social cleavages. A significant portion of
the AKP supporters in Turkey were angry at the main opposition party because of
the behavior of opposition partisans. Yet, the opposition party’s political strategy
during the last few years has been decreasing polarization in the country; the slogan
of the opposition candidate in the Istanbul election was “radical love” (Esen and
Gumuscu, 2019). In such an environment, the incumbent may find it difficult to
sustain partisan anger forever. It may be even harder to sustain voters’ enthusiasm.
Building a bright vision for the future, economic development, domestic political
victories and an aggressive foreign policy may help the incumbent to gain enthusiastic
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support from voters, as demonstrated in Chapter 5. However, enthusiasm eventually
ebbs away as people adjust their expectations accordingly. For example, Greene
and Robertson (2019) demonstrate that the annexation of Crimea by the Russian
state created an enthusiasm boost in Russia, significantly improving Putin’s approval
ratings. Yet, even the effects of this major event lasted for two years, and then
completely evaporated.
We should also be careful not to conclude that we need a dispassionate form of
politics to sustain the democratic equilibrium. To the contrary, opposition parties
need to evoke enthusiasm and anger among their own supporters, especially under
competitive authoritarian regimes. These emotions can substitute for the lack of
material resources, and they can help mobilizing people against the emerging authoritarian rule. In fact, opposition parties in Turkey won local elections in Istanbul and
Ankara despite the AKP’s widespread use of state resources, mainly because they
could imbue voters with a sense of enthusiasm and hope. Relying on these feelings,
thousands of opposition voters voluntarily organized on the election day to prevent
election fraud.
These two points lead to the conclusion that affective political ties can influence
the outcome of executive aggrandizement in many different ways, and we should
always avoid broad and hasty generalizations.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3: MEASURING PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION
USING CSES VERSUS LAPOP

As we use LAPOP questions to measure partisanship, there are two important
points to keep in mind. First, the wording of the LAPOP partisanship question is
not in complete fit with the theory of partisanship. The question is formulated as “
¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido polı́tico?” This can be translated to
English as “Do you currently identify with a political party?” If partisanship will be
meaningful as a concept, we should assume that it is a stable phenomenon. This is
why CSES questions include “usually” when they ask about party identification. By
using “currently,” LAPOP questions may be shifting the attention towards current
evaluations of parties. There is no reason to assume that, however, this form of the
question necessarily underestimates the proportion of partisans.
Another issue to consider is that CSES surveys are fielded when partisan ties are
at their strongest. These are post-election surveys, fielded several weeks after the
election. Recent research has demonstrated that election cycles strengthen partisan
ties (Singh and Thornton, 2019). LAPOP surveys, on the other hand, are rarely
fielded right after elections. In this sense, LAPOP surveys will underestimate the
proportion of partisans, compared to post-election surveys such as CSES or ANES.
To have a sense of the difference in terms of outcomes, I compare partisanship
proportions in countries included in both surveys in Table A.1 on the next page.
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Table A.1: CSES - LAPOP comparison
Country

Percentage of Partisans (Survey Year)

Argentina (CSES)
Argentina (LAPOP)

42 (2015)
26 (2014)

Brazil (CSES)
Brazil (LAPOP)

33 (2006)
34 (2006)

Chile (CSES)
Chile (LAPOP)

35 (2005)

Mexico (CSES)
Mexico (LAPOP)

56 (2006)
49 (2006) 32 (2008)

56 (2009)

Peru (CSES)
Peru (LAPOP)

39 (2006)
30 (2006)

48 (2011)

25 (2014)
23 (2014)
26 (2009)

26 (2006) 21 (2008)

Uruguay
Uruguay (LAPOP)
Turkey (CSES)
Bolivia (LAPOP)

48 (2010)
31 (2010)

20 (2016-17)

10 (2010)

29 (2010)

21 (2010)

45 (2012)
36 (2012)
37 (2016)

16 (2012)

16 (2016-7)

77 (2009)
50 (2008)

27 (2008)

66(2010)

72 (2011)
73 (2015)
33 (2010) 16 (2012) 26 (2014) 17 (2016) 19 (2019)

Table A.1 clearly demonstrates that LAPOP surveys underestimate the proportion
of partisans. However, this difference is not large, especially if both surveys are
conducted in the election year. In Mexico, Peru, and Brazil, where several LAPOP
surveys are conducted in election years, the difference is less than 10 points, with the
exception of 2010 elections in Brazil.
2014 and 2019 LAPOP surveys in Bolivia were conducted in election years, which
means that we can expect margin of difference between CSES and LAPOP to be
lower. Furthermore, the proportion of partisans in Bolivia is quite low, even when
we take into account the difference between LAPOP and CSES surveys. In no other
LAPOP surveys, we see a proportion lower than 20 % in an election year, as it is
the case in Bolivia in 2019. This gives confidence about my claims in Chapter 3,
regarding the weakness of partisan ties in Bolivia.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3: MEASURING ANGER TO OPPOSITION
CANDIDATE

The survey experiment in Chapter 3 manipulated partisan emotions towards the
“right-wing political parties and politicians” in Bolivia. It might be argued that
the presidential nature of Bolivian political system requires attention to opposition’s
presidential candidates too. Due to this concern, I collected another sample, in which
I manipulated emotions towards the opposition’s main candidate in the presidential
election of 2019, Carlos Mesa. As such, Table B.1 presents results of the regression
model testing whether the anger treatment has successfully manipulated partisan
emotions towards Carlos Mesa among incumbent party voters in Bolivia. We do not
see a statistically significant effect for any of the emotions.

Table B.1: Manipulation check: Manipulating anger to the opposition candidate in
Bolivia
Anger

Anger
Fear
(Full model)
Treatment: Anger to Opposition 1.514
1.423
0.0213
Base: Daily Routine
(0.056)
(0.080)
(0.976)
N
173
167
173
p-values in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001
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Fear
Enthusiasm
(Full model)
0.107
-0.318
(0.882)
(0.732)
167
172

Enthusiasm
(Full Model)
-0.448
(0.619)
167

Figure B.1 presents results of the regression model testing this treatment’s effect on support for authoritarianism. Results are the same with those presented in
Chapter 3: the treatment does not have any effect on support for the incumbent’s
authoritarian agenda.

Figure B.1: Effects of anger towards opposition candidate on attitudes towards autocratization in Bolivia
DV: Fourth Term is Fair
DV: Limit opp. activities
DV: Permit opp. campaign
DV: Repeat elections if opp. wins
DV: Ban opp. candidates
DV: Executive coup is OK -1
DV: Executive coup is OK - 2
-1

-.5

0

.5

1

Controls: Age, Education, Income, Gender, Partisanship. CI:95
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

In this section, I presents results of the regression models used as robustness checks
for the analysis in Chapter 4.
In the first robustness check, I use Polity and Freedom House scores as dependent
variable, instead of electoral democracy index from V-Dem. The negative effect of affective polarization over the incumbent becomes even more substantial and significant
with these dependent variables.
In Robustness Check 2, I use different temporal specifications in the dynamic
model. Rather than regressing democracy scores at t+3 over democracy scores at t1, I regressed democracy scores at t+2 over democracy scores at t-1, democracy scores
at t+3 over democracy scores at t, and democracy score over t+4 over democracy
score at t. The effect of affective polarization over the incumbent is weakest, in terms
of coefficient size, when we attempt to predict democracy score at t+2. This must
be because the negative effects have not yet accumulated enough by the end of the
second year after elections. Even in this case, however, all models are significant at
0.05 significance level.
In Robustness Check 3, I use a slightly different operationalization of affective
polarization over the incumbent. Rather than defining extreme feelings as 0, 1, 9,
and 10, I defined extreme values as 0, 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10. This operationalization is the
same with Lauka et al. (2018)’s operationalization. Coefficient sizes of incumbent polarization score are slightly smaller because this operationalization is less successful at
distinguishing extremely polarized voters from moderate voters. However, coefficients
are still significant at 0.01 significance level across all three models.
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0.11
(0.13)
-0.13
(0.12)

Regime Age

GDP per capita

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

118

-0.13
(0.11)

Population

119

0.22
(0.11)

Religious Fractionalization

FH at t-1

-0.15
(0.12)

-0.18
(0.13)

0.13
(0.15)

-0.38***
(0.09)

0.36
(0.08)

***

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.13
(0.10)

0.20
(0.11)

Presidentialism

Proportional System

-0.15
(0.11)

-0.09
(0.12)

Party Fragmentation

119

-0.36***
(0.08)

Incumbent Polarization
0.10
(0.12)

-0.39***
(0.09)

0.43
(0.07)

Polity at t-1

0.45
(0.07)

***

0.66***
(0.06)
131

-0.03
(0.07)

0.05
(0.07)

-0.25***
(0.05)

Robustness Check 1: Different Measures of Democracy as Dependent Variables
Polity at t+3
Polity at t+3
FH at t+3

***

Polity at t+3

0.62***
(0.06)
130

0.19**
(0.06)

0.11
(0.06)

-0.13*
(0.06)

-0.02
(0.07)

0.09
(0.08)

-0.28***
(0.05)

FH at t+3

0.55***
(0.06)
130

-0.09
(0.07)

0.13
(0.07)

-0.16*
(0.07)

-0.05
(0.08)

0.09
(0.09)

-0.23***
(0.05)

FH at t+3

119

-0.14***
(0.04)

0.03
(0.07)
0.34***
(0.05)

-0.12**
(0.04)
0.09
(0.12)
0.03
(0.07)
0.38***
(0.05)

Incumbent Polarization

Regime Age

GDP per capita

Democracy at t-1

-0.01
(0.07)

Proportional System

Observations
139
Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Democracy at t

Population

Religious
Fractionalization

138

0.06
(0.08)

Presidentialism

Ethnic
Fractionalization

-0.14**
(0.05)

Party Fragmentation

0.11
(0.12)

Democracy at
t+2

Democracy at
t+2

137

-0.16
(0.10)

(0.10)

0.21

0.42***
(0.06)
131

0.33***
(0.06)
130

-0.13
(0.10)

(0.10)

0.16

(0.10)

0.21***
(0.06)
125

0.25***
(0.06)
125

0.12
(0.09)

-0.12
(0.08)

0.04
(0.09)

0.19
(0.13)

-0.29***
(0.06)

0.16*
(0.08)

(0.10)
*

0.02
(0.09)

0.19
(0.14)

-0.27***
(0.06)

Democracy at
t+4

0.12
(0.10)

-0.05
(0.08)

0.19
(0.12)

-0.20***
(0.05)

Democracy at
t+4

0.14
(0.08)

-0.17*
(0.07)

0.01
(0.08)

0.19
(0.11)

-0.27***
(0.05)

-0.22*

0.40***
(0.06)
132

-0.01
(0.08)

0.16
(0.11)

-0.24***
(0.05)

-0.22*

0.34***
(0.05)

0.02
(0.07)

0.08
(0.12)

-0.09*
(0.04)

Robustness Check 2: Different Temporal Specifications
Democracy at
Democracy at
Democracy at
Democracy at
t+2
t+3
t+3
t+3

0.16**
(0.06)
123

-0.12
(0.12)

(0.12)

0.22

(0.12)

-0.28*

-0.01
(0.09)

0.17
(0.15)

-0.23***
(0.06)

Democracy at
t+4

Robustness Check 3: Incumbent Polarization Differently Measured
Democracy at t+3 Democracy at t+3 Democracy at t+3
Democracy at t-1

0.47***
(0.10)

0.51***
(0.11)

0.40***
(0.08)

Incumbent Polarization

-0.18***
(0.05)

-0.20***
(0.05)

-0.14**
(0.05)

Regime Age

0.17
(0.12)

0.17
(0.11)

0.19
(0.12)

GDP per capita

-0.01
(0.08)

0.02
(0.08)

-0.05
(0.08)

Party Fragmentation

-0.13
(0.07)

Presidentialism

0.14
(0.09)

Proportional System

0.13
(0.08)
-0.20*
(0.10)

Ethnic Fractionalization
Religious
Fractionalization

0.15
(0.09)

Population
Observations

132

131

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

1

120

-0.14
(0.09)
130

In Robustness Check 4 and 5, I use different statistical models. In the fourth
robustness check, I cluster standard errors, instead of a mixed effects model. This
reduces the statistical power of the model. Incumbent polarization score is significant
in only one out of three models; other polarization variables are not significant in any
of the models. Still, affective polarization over the incumbent seems to be a better
predictor than other polarization variables.
In Robustness Check 5, I use a fixed effects model. This is a more conservative
test because it limits variation to observations from the same country. This model
has a lower explanatory power to explain the lagged dependent variable since the
variation is limited to within case analysis. Even in this model, we find that the
affective polarization over the incumbent is significant at 0.01 level. Effect sizes range
from -0.16 to -0.21.
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122
0.13
(0.185)

Proportional System

141

143

-0.05
(0.198)
130

Population

Observations
132
142
141
144
131
141
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All values are standardized.

0.05
(0.343)

-0.11
(0.308)

-0.03
(0.696)

Religious Fractionalization

0.12
(0.170)

0.08
(0.161)

-0.10
(0.097)

-0.08
(0.181)

0.07
(0.154)

-0.05
(0.415)

0.17
(0.131)

0.12
(0.123)

-0.15*
(0.018)

-0.06
(0.309)

0.05
(0.373)

0.06
(0.082)

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.15
(0.125)

0.13
(0.104)

0.22*
(0.041)

Presidentialism

-0.11
(0.107)
-0.13*
(0.039)

-0.04
(0.372)

0.00
(0.997)

0.09
(0.170)

-0.10*
(0.039)

0.01
(0.816)

-0.17*
(0.020)

0.01
(0.927)

Party Fragmentation

Mass Ideological Polarization

Mass Affective Polarization

Party System Polarization

0.05
(0.243)

0.04
(0.407)

-0.08
(0.146)
140

0.02
(0.773)

-0.01
(0.848)

-0.04
(0.504)

0.05
(0.361)

0.04
(0.343)

-0.07
(0.108)
139

0.02
(0.768)

-0.02
(0.701)

-0.06
(0.229)

0.01
(0.888)

-0.12
(0.126)

0.04
(0.396)

0.06
(0.348)

Incumbent Polarization

0.07
(0.205)

0.05
(0.387)

-0.01
(0.817)

0.06
(0.396)

GDP per capita

0.02
(0.332)

0.07
(0.104)

0.04
(0.130)

0.05*
(0.033)

Regime Age

0.03
(0.284)

Social3
0.76***
(0.000)

Democracy at t-1

Robustness Check 4 (Clustering Standard Errors): Effects over Democracy Scores at t + 3
Basic1 Basic2 Basic3 Basic4
Inst1
Inst2
Inst3
Inst4
Social1 Social2
0.76*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.79***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

-0.04
(0.232)
142

-0.01
(0.798)

0.03
(0.643)

-0.11
(0.102)

0.05
(0.310)

0.03
(0.420)

Social4
0.68***
(0.000)
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-0.10
(0.12)
-0.17**
(0.06)

GDP per capita

Incumbent Polarization

Observations
132
142
141
144
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

131

141

141

143

-0.42
(0.42)
130

Population

-0.16**
(0.06)

-0.11
(0.12)

0.34
(0.39)

0.00
(.)

-0.17
(0.09)

0.00
(.)

-0.11*
(0.05)

0.11
(0.05)

0.03
(0.08)

-0.34
(0.25)

Religious Fractionalization

-0.25
(0.14)

0.02
(0.14)

-0.22*
(0.09)

-0.06
(0.07)

-0.17
(0.13)

0.24
(0.39)

0.00
(.)

-0.26
(0.14)

0.00
(.)

-0.11
(0.07)

-0.01
(0.05)

0.02
(0.11)

-0.34
(0.34)

Ethnic Fractionalization

-0.22
(0.13)

Proportional System

-0.21***
(0.05)

-0.18
(0.12)

0.52
(0.38)

-0.01
(0.13)

0.14**
(0.04)

0.06
(0.08)

-0.47
(0.24)

Presidentialism

0.04
(0.06)

-0.16
(0.13)

0.13
(0.38)

-0.22**
(0.07)

0.02
(0.05)

0.05
(0.11)

-0.48
(0.32)

-0.93
(0.49)
140

0.00
(.)

0.00
(.)

0.01
(0.05)

0.02
(0.11)

-0.22
(0.35)

Robustness Check 5 (Fixed Effect Model): Effects over Democracy Scores at t+3
Basic2 Basic3 Basic4
Inst1
Inst2
Inst3
Inst4 Social1 Social2
0.07
0.19** 0.14***
0.16*
0.06 0.19** 0.13*** 0.18**
0.08
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
(0.07)
(0.05)

Party Fragmentation

Mass Ideological Polarization

Mass Affective Polarization

Party System Polarization

0.22
(0.37)

Regime Age

Democracy at t-1

Basic1
0.18**
(0.07)

-0.65
(0.42)
139

0.00
(.)

0.00
(.)

0.04
(0.06)

-0.17
(0.13)

0.31
(0.40)

Social3
0.19**
(0.07)

0.09
(0.27)
142

0.00
(.)

0.00
(.)

0.14**
(0.04)

0.06
(0.08)

-0.50
(0.26)

Social4
0.14***
(0.04)

Robustness check 6, presented on this page, uses clustered standard errors, rather
than a mixed effects model, to test determinants of incumbent polarization. Results
are similar to Figure 4.6 in Chapter 4. The interaction of party system polarization
with executive constraints and legislative constraint variables are significant at 0.01
significance level. The interaction between party system polarization and judicial
constraint, on the other hand, has a p value of 0.076.

Robustness Check 6 (Clustered Standard Errors): Determinants of Incumbent Polarization
IP
IP
IP
GDP per capita
-0.040***
-0.035**
-0.028***
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.007)
Regime Age

0.011
(0.007)

0.009
(0.008)

0.011
(0.007)

Presidentialism

0.012
(0.008)

0.018
(0.010)

0.010
(0.010)

Proportional System

-0.001
(0.009)

-0.005
(0.009)

0.001
(0.008)

Party Fragmentation

-0.002
(0.008)

0.001
(0.007)

-0.003
(0.008)

Ethnic Fractionalization

0.015
(0.010)

0.013
(0.010)

0.010
(0.010)

Religious Fractionalization

-0.008
(0.010)

-0.007
(0.010)

-0.003
(0.010)

Population

0.013
(0.008)

0.007
(0.008)

0.017
(0.010)

Party System Polarization

0.138**
(0.044)

0.113***
(0.028)

0.107*
(0.047)

Constraints (Polity)

0.028
(0.014)

Party System Polarization #
Constraints (Polity)

-0.017**
(0.006)

Legislative Constraints

0.218
(0.115)

Party System Polarization #
Legislative Constraints

-0.112**
(0.033)

Judicial Constraints

0.018
(0.130)

Party System Polarization #
Judicial Constraints

-0.097

Observations
128
134
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

124

(0.054)
134

APPENDIX D
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 5: YOUTUBE LINKS FOR VIDEOS

In the following three pages, URL links and further information are provided for
30 videos that are analyzed in Chapter 5. This list was created on September 21,
2017. Some of the videos might have been removed from YouTube since then.
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Table D.1: Videos analyzed for Chapter 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views
Title of the video:
Link
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:

”OSMANGAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ”nden Geçen Kamyoncu (Süper) :D
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mNFH2JDkLbI
Muhammet Türkyılmaz
2-Jul-16
14498
Osmangazi Köprüsü açıldı. Bizde geçtik. 01.07.2016
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NBuyh6B1Dyo
Her Telden
1-Jul-16
14286
Orhan gazi körfez köprüsü ilk geçiş
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iiFzj7CGMYg
ekrem karaduman
12-Jul-16
4462 views
OSMAN GAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ-2016
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rXGUZiZYbRc
Muhammed Bulut
9-Jul-16
427 views
Osmangazi köprüsü süper
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA0aHUQUC4s
Yasin Pamuk
30-Jun-16
419 views
Osmangazi Köprüsü Vatana ve millete Hayırlı olsuz. ZORUNA GİDEN GEÇMESİN DELİKANLI OLSUN
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kycqjaCwLM0
Ahmet bayraktar
7-Jul-16
111 views
Osman Gazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdpCyn3Igeo
Mehmet Koylu
7-Jul-16
77 views
Mehter marşı eşliğinde osman gazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWlbe6o1Zp0
Mevlut Guzey
7-Jul-16
151 views
Osmangazi Köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FEcBWp7lkh8
Kafkas Kartalı
9-Jul-11
52 views
OSMAN GAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ GECE GEÇİŞİ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utbVb2aSIJw&t=119s
Serhat Turan
4-Jul-16
856 views
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Table D.2: Videos analyzed for Chapter 5
11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:

Osman gazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RMr4 4NlgKo
Abdulbasit Yazıcı
Jul 4, 2016
83 views
osmangazi köprüsü hizmetin hası
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRuNpR6Jt7g
Nuh BEKTAŞ
July 4, 2016
293 views
osmangazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kW9jBU5f86Q
yasin kambur
Jul 5, 2016
174 views
Osmangazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZ48iKQAobQ
Minişler ve Biz
Jul 9, 2016
42 views
Osman gazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoWbiDhCQio
HAKAN BAŞ
Jul 7, 2016
32 views
işte osmangazi köprüsü mehter marşı ile :))
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YX2tleSW5eI
Davut Ustun
Jul 6, 2016
204 views
Osmangazi köprüsü. Dombıra
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbgEY1MUMS0
Ercan Alkan
Jul 6, 2016
233 views
TÜRKÜN KÖPRÜSU OSMANGAZİ KÖPRÜSU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BlZcms6vMl4
Osman Demir
Jul 7, 2016
52 views
Osman gazi köprüsü onlar konuşur akp yapar
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwrygWj1vlo
Gülçin Sevgili
Jul 6, 2016
57 views
Dünyanın en uzun köprülerinden OSMAN GAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ ALLAH TAYİP ERDOĞANI başımızdan eksik etmesin.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hw3tt5jRXwQ
şevket çalıkuşu
Jul 2, 2016
47 views
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Table D.3: Videos analyzed for Chapter 5
21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:
Title of the video:
Link:
Publisher:
Publishing Date:
Views:

3 Temmuz 2016 OSMANGAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYyvw0xsMuc
RECEP TAYYİP ERDOĞAN
Jul 3, 2016
108 views
Osmangazi köprüsü ilk geçişimiz
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKBzM-0KSRU
uğur Kabil
Jul 5, 2016
26 views
Osmangazi Köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tS4K7TtVGN8
mustafa topaloğlu
Jul 5, 2016
47 views
Osmangazi köprüsü
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pe5A5fepJZI
zonguldak lı
Jul 5, 2016
77 views
Osman Gazi köprüsü ınstagram yalcincoban02
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ji4e3XLyVnY
Yalcin Coban
Jul 4, 2016
142 views
Osman gazi köprüsü. Allah bin kere razı olsun bu millet için çalışanlara
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlRJDOWOZ1g
Halil Gul
Jul 4, 2016
54 views (Unavailable)
RTY#Osman gazi#köprü#Mzl
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bo84lJh0miw
Mehmet Zeki Lazoglu
Jul 7, 2016
84 views
Osmangazi koprusu neşet kara
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LrwlZQNGHsw
Neşet Kara
July 4 2016
287 views
Osman gazi köprüsü ilk görüntüler
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdPs-y sE5c
Yılmaz Akar
Jul 4, 2016
85 views
OSMAN GAZİ KÖPRÜSÜ.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sN 6OeayVEI
özdemir ArıÇiftliği mehmet özdemir
Jul 3, 2016
619 views
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Medeiros, M. and A. Noël, “The forgotten side of partisanship: negative party identification in four anglo-american democracies”, Comparative Political Studies 47,
7, 1022–1046 (2014).
Merolla, J. L., J. M. Ramos and E. J. Zechmeister, “Crisis, charisma, and consequences: Evidence from the 2004 us presidential election”, The Journal of Politics
69, 1, 30–42 (2007).
Miller, P. R., “The emotional citizen: Emotion as a function of political sophistication”, Political psychology 32, 4, 575–600 (2011).
Montiel, C. J. and J. Uyheng, “Mapping contentious collective emotions in a populist
democracy: Duterte’s push for philippine federalism”, Political Psychology (2020).
Mudde, C., “Populism: An ideational approach”, in “The Oxford handbook of populism”, (Oxford University Press Oxford, 2017).
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Saraçoğlu, C. and Ö. Demirkol, “Nationalism and foreign policy discourse in Turkey
under the AKP rule: Geography, history and national identity”, British Journal of
Middle Eastern Studies 42, 3, 301–319 (2015).
Sarfati, Y., “How Turkey’s slide to authoritarianism defies modernization theory”,
Turkish Studies 18, 3, 395–415 (2017).
Sartori, G., “Politics, ideology, and belief systems”, American Political Science Review
63, 2, 398–411 (1969).
Sartori, G., Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis (ECPR press, 2005).
Schaffner, B. F., M. MacWilliams and T. Nteta, “Understanding white polarization
in the 2016 vote for president: The sobering role of racism and sexism”, Political
Science Quarterly 133, 1, 9–34 (2018).
Scherbaum, C. A. and J. M. Ferreter, “Estimating statistical power and required
sample sizes for organizational research using multilevel modeling”, Organizational
Research Methods 12, 2, 347–367 (2009).
Scuzzarello, S., “Narratives and social identity formation among Somalis and postenlargement Poles”, Political Psychology 36, 2, 181–198 (2015).
Selçuk, O., “Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela
and Ecuador”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, 4, 571–589 (2016).
Shively, W. P., “The development of party identification among adults: Exploration
of a functional model”, American Political Science Review 73, 4, 1039–1054 (1979).

143

Singer, M., “Delegating away democracy: How good representation and policy successes can undermine democratic legitimacy”, Comparative Political Studies 51,
13, 1754–1788 (2018).
Singh, S. P. and J. R. Thornton, “Elections activate partisanship across countries”,
American Political Science Review 113, 1, 248–253 (2019).
Skonieczny, A., “Emotions and political narratives: Populism, trump and trade”,
Politics and Governance 6, 4, 62–72 (2018).
Small, D. A., J. S. Lerner and B. Fischhoff, “Emotion priming and attributions for
terrorism: Americans’ reactions in a national field experiment”, Political Psychology 27, 2, 289–298 (2006).
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